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THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT'S NOTICE 
AND COMMENT REQUIREMENTS: "GOOD CAUSE" FOR 
FURTHER DELAY IN THE IMPLEMENTATION 
OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT? 
Steven L. Feldman * 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Congress has been struggling with the problem of air pollution in 
the United States for over twenty-five years. During this time period 
numerous laws have been enacted, l all of which have attained only 
moderate success in dealing with this important national problem. 2 
Most recently, Congress passed the 1977 Amendments3 to the Clean 
Air Act (CAA) of 1970.4 The revised statutory scheme set down a 
strict schedule requiring that certain national ambient air quality 
• Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
1. The Clean Air Act was first passed in 1955 as Pub. L. No. 84-159, 69 Stat. 322 (1955). It 
has been amended over the years by the following laws: 
Clean Air Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (1963); Motor Vehicle Air 
Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 89-272, 79 Stat. 992 (1965); Clean Air Act Amend-
ments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-675, 80 Stat. 954 (1966); Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. 
L. No. 90-148,81 Stat. 485 (1967); Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 
91-604,84 Stat. 1676 (1970); Comprehensive Health Manpower Training Act of 1971, 
Pub. L. No. 92-157, 85 Stat. 431 (1971); Energy Supply & Environmental Coordina-
tion Act, Pub. L. No. 93-319, 88 Stat. 246 (1974); Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, 
Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977). 
The Clean Air Act is currently codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7626 (Supp. III 1979). 
2. H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 207, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. 
NEWS 1077, 1286. 
3. Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7626 (Supp. III 
1979». 
4. Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-18571 (1976), 
recodified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7626 (Supp. III 1979». This law is technically an amendment to 
the Clean Air Act (CAA) which was originally enacted in 1955 as Pub. L. No. 84-159, 69 Stat. 
322. However, in reality, its enactment so drastically changed the earlier versions of the CAA 
that the 1970 law is now commonly referred to as the Clean Air Act of 1970. It is the 1970 Act 
which forms the basis of the current CAA which was most recently amended in 1977. See note 
1 supra. 
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standards (NAAQS)5 be attained by December 31, 1982.6 The 1977 
Clean Air Act Amendments direct the United States Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) to coordinate a joint federal-state program 
designed largely to attain the primary and secondary NAAQS levels 
which had not been fully achieved under the 1970 Act.7 In pro-
mulgating regulations required by section 107(d) of the 1977 Amend-
ments,8 the EPA bypassed certain notice and comment procedures 
arguably required by section 5539 of the Administrative Procedure 
Act (AP A).lO These notice and comment procedures are designed to 
allow for public input in the agency rulemaking process.ll The EPA 
argued that its action was allowable under the two "good cause" 
exceptions to section 553 of the AP A.12 It reasoned that the tight 
statutory deadlines mandated by Congress in section 107(d) made 
notice and comment procedures "impracticable and contrary to the 
public interest. "13 
Absent the usual notice and comment procedures, the regulations 
issued by the EPA were quickly challenged in the courts by industry 
and several states.14 The plaintiffs claimed that their rights under 
5. 42 U.S.C. S 7409 (Supp. III 1979). NAAQS are pollution standards set by the EPA which 
define what levels of pollution, for various pollutants, are considered acceptable under the 
CAA. NAAQS are divided into two basic categories under § 7409: a) Primary NAAQS; and b) 
Secondary NAAQS. Primary NAAQS are defined under § 7409(b)(1) as "requisite to protect 
the public health." Secondary NAAQS are defined in § 7409(b)(2) as "requisite to protect the 
public welfare from any known or anticipated adverse effects associated with the presence of 
such air pollutant in the ambient air." For further discussion of these categories, see text at 
notes 29-35 infra. 
6. 42 U.S.C. § 7502(a)(1) (Supp. III 1979). 
7. 42 U.S.C. §S 1857-18571 (1976) (recodified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7626 (Supp. III 1979». 
The 1970 Act had set a nationwide deadline of July 1, 1975, for attaining primary NAAQS 
while secondary NAAQS were required to be attained within a "reasonable time," defined in 
most SIP's to be the same as the primary standard's attainment date. However, these 
deadlines were only partially met throughout the nation. See text at notes 48-49 infra. 
8. 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d) (Supp. III 1979). These regulations required EPA to designate areas 
of the country as attainment, nonattainment, or unclassifiable for various pollutants. They are 
discussed in great detail later in this article. See text at note 68 infra. 
9. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976). These notice and comment procedures are described in more detail 
later in this article. See text at notes 98-107 infra. 
10. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1976). 
11. See generally Bonfield, Public Participation in Federal Rulerrw,king Relating to Public 
Property, Loans, Grants, Benefits, or Contracts, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 540 (1970). 
12. 5 U.S.C. S 553(b)(3)(B), (d)(3). These two exceptions basically allow an agency to follow 
normal rule making procedures under § 553 upon a showing of "good cause." See text at notes 
108-220 infra. 
13. 43 Fed. Reg. 8,962, 8,962 (1978). 
14. Five cases involving this issue were fully litigated. They are: U.S. Steel Corp. v. EPA, 
595 F.2d 207 (5th Cir. 1979); Sharon Steel Corp. v. EPA, 597 F.2d 377 (3d Cir. 1979); U.S. 
Steel Corp. v. EPA, 605 F.2d 283 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S.Ct. 710 (1980); Republic 
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the APA had been violated, thereby making the EPA's section 
107(d) designations15 invalid. Of the five cases in 1979-80 in which 
the validity of the EPA's regulations were challenged, three circuit 
courts of appeal held that the EPA did not have good cause to bypass 
the ordinary procedures and that plaintiffs' rights under the AP A 
had been violated. 16 Two circuits held, to the contrary, that the EPA 
acted properly in invoking the good cause exceptions, finding no sec-
tion 553 violationY Since the United States Supreme Court has 
denied certiorari18 to review the issues presented in these cases, this 
area has been left in a state of confusion and flux. 
This split among the circuits has had a great impact upon the im-
plementation of the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments, while also 
casting severe doubts as to when the AP A's good cause exceptions 
will be allowed. Primarily, the effect of this litigation has been to 
postpone significantly the attainment of primary NAAQS19 
(NPAAQS) in those circuits where the EPA's designations were 
overturned. This postponement takes on added significance when 
viewed in light of the long history of congressional attempts to lower 
the amount of pollutants in the air-attempts which have continually 
met with only partial success. Also, the three-to-two split by the five 
circuits over the applicability of the section 553 good cause excep-
tions has left the scope of these exceptions in a quite muddled state. 
This article will analyze the various issues raised in these five cir-
cuit court opinions, concentrating on the good cause issue and its ef-
fects on the implementation of the CAA. First, a brief history of the 
relevant portions of both the CAA and AP A will be presented in 
order to understand the context in which these cases arise. Second, 
Steel Corp. v. Costle, 621 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1980); N.J. v. EPA, 626 F.2d 1038 (D.C. Cir. 
1980). Numerous other challenges were also initially raised, but were not fully litigated for 
various reasons. For a comprehensive listing of all suits initially filed on this issue see 
Lawsuits Challenging EPA's Area Designations Under Section 107(d) of the Clean Air Act, 
May 15, 1979 (EPA Internal Memorandum). 
15. The word "designation" in this article is used to refer to the EPA regulations issued 
under § 107(d) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d), see note 8 supra, designating areas as attain-
ment, nonattainment, or unclassifiable for various pollutants. See text at notes 129-33 infra. 
Thus, it is synonymous with the word "regulation," whenever "regulation" is used to refer to 
the § 107(d) designations. 
16. U.S. Steel Corp. v. EPA, 595 F.2d 207 (5th Cir. 1979); Sharon Steel Corp. v. EPA, 597 
F.2d 377 (3d Cir. 1979); N.J. v. EPA, 626 F.2d 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
17. U.S. Steel Corp. v. EPA, 605 F.2d 283 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S.Ct. 710 (1980); 
Republic Steel Corp. v. Costle, 621 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1980). 
18. U.S. Steel Corp. v. EPA, 605 F.2d 283 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S.Ct. 710 (1980). 
19. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (Supp. III 1979). See note 5 supra. 
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this article will discuss the five courts' analyses of the good cause 
issue. In discussing the circuits' treatment of this issue, this article 
will analyze the earlier case law on these section 553 exceptions, 
attempting to discern from it various trends and lines of thought. 
Also, the relationship between the strong public policies which 
underlie the CAA, the AP A, and the good cause exceptions will be 
examined. At the end of this discussion, some conclusions will be 
given regarding the effects of this circuit split on both the scope of 
the good cause exceptions and on the implementation of the 1977 
Amendments to the CAA. Third, various secondary issues faced by 
these five courts including harmless error,20 judicial review,21 and 
remedial relief will be discussed, noting the effect of these issues on 
the implementation of the 1977 Amendments. Finally, some conclu-
sions will be offered regarding the effect of these five cases on both 
the various legal issues involved and the implementation of the CAA 
as well. Also, the various factors contributing to this unfortunate 
litigation, and the lessons to be learned from it, will be presented. 
II. THE SETTING: BACKGROUND AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
OF THE CAA AND THE AP A 
A. TheCAA 
1. History Prior to 1977 
Congress' attempts to legislate solutions to air pollution date back 
to 1955 when the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce 
recommended, and Congress enacted, a federal air pollution 
research and technical assistance program which has become known 
as the Clean Air Act.22 In 1963, Amendments to the Clean Air Act2S 
were passed, calling for a greater federal role than under the 1955 
20. The harmless error doctrine, as used in this article, refers primarily to § 706 of the APA, 
5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976), which states that "due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial 
error." See text at notes 292·333 infra. 
21. This article will focus on the Seventh Circuit's unique interpretation of the CAA's 
judicial review provision-S 307(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d) (Supp. III 1979); see text at notes 
334-65 infra. 
22. Pub. L. No. 84-159, 69 Stat. 322 (1955). The 1955 Act referred to was originally entitled 
"Air Pollution Control-Research and Technical Assistance." The 1963 Amendments to that 
Act amended the title to read "An Act to provide for air pollution prevention and control ac-
tivities of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, and for other purposes." Pub. L. 
No. 88-206, S 14(2), 77 Stat. 392 (1963). However, S 14 of the 1963 bill also provided that 
"[t]his act may be cited as the 'Clean Air Act'." Pub. L. No. 88-206, § 14, 77 Stat. 392 (1963). 
23. Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (1963). 
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Act.24 The CAA was amended many other times26 in order' 'to im-
prove, strengthen and accelerate programs for the abatement and 
prevention of air pollution."26 Yet it was not until 1970 that Con-
gress developed a comprehensive program for the elimination of air 
pollution in the United States by restructuring the CAA.27 
In order to attack effectively the air pollution problem, Congress 
24. The 1955 Act provided for federal involvement only to the extent that it funded 
research (at about a $5 million per year level). The Committee stressed that: "The bill does not 
propose any exercise of police power by the Federal Government, and no provision in it in-
vades the sovereignty of states, counties, or cities." S. REP. No. 389, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 4, 
reprinted in [1955] U.S. CONGo CODE & AD. NEWS 2457, 2459. While the 1963 Act kept control 
primarily in the hands of state and local governments, it did call for a substantially greater 
federal role. First, it called for a greatly expanded role in supporting state and local control 
programs and increased funds for federal research to be conducted by the Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW). Second, it gave the federal government a role in 
abating pollution by authorizing it to deal with interstate air pollution problems on an ad hoc 
basis through a cumbersome abatement procedure. Pub. L. No. 88-206, § 5, 77 Stat. 392 
(1963). 
25. See note 1 supra. 
26. Buckeye Power, Inc. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 162,165 (6th Cir. 1973). This case is commonly 
referred to as Buckeye Power No. l. 
27. Whereas the earlier enactments had made some inroads in dealing with the nation's air 
quality problems, the 1970 Act was much more ambitious legislation. This was made clear in 
the House report on the 1970 Amendments which stated: 
The purpose of the legislation reported unanimously by your committee is to speed 
up, expand, and intensify the war against air pollution in the United States with a 
view to assuring that the air we breathe throughout the Nation is wholesome once 
again. The Air Quality Act of 1967 (Public Law 90-148) and its predecessor acts have 
been instrumental in starting us off in this direction. A review of achievements to 
date, however, make abundantly clear that the strategies which we have pursued in 
the war against air pollution have been inadequate in several important respects, and 
the methods employed in implementing those strategies often have been slow and less 
effective than they might have been. 
H.R. REp. No. 91-1146, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. 
NEWS 5356, 5356. 
The report went on to state the reasons why this legislation was needed, remarking that: 
Air pollution continues to be a threat to the health and well-being of the American 
people. While a start has been made in controlling air pollution since the enactment of 
the Air Quality Act of 1967, progress has been regrettably slow. This has been due to 
a number of factors: (1) cumbersome and time-consuming procedures called for under 
the 1967 act; (2) inadequate funding on Federal, State and local levels; (3) scarcity of 
skilled personnel to enforce control measures; (4) inadequacy of available test and 
control technologies; (5) organizational problems on the Federal level where air pollu-
tion control has not been accorded a sufficiently high priority; and (6) last, but not 
least, failure on the part of the National Air Pollution Control Administration to 
demonstrate sufficient aggressiveness in implementing present law. 
. . . Therefore, it is urgent that Congress adopt a new clean air legislation which 
will make possible the more expeditious imposition of specific emission standards 
both for mobile and stationary sources and the effective enforcement of such stand-
ards by both State and Federal agencies. 
[d. at 5, U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS at 5360. 
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totally revamped the previous legislation when it enacted the 1970 
Amendments. The basic features of the 1970 Act28 need to be outlined 
as they form the basis upon which the 1977 Amendments rest. 
First, the 1970 Act required the EPA to establish National Am-
bient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS). These are divided into two 
groups: primary and secondary.29 The primary standards, designed 
to protect the public health, define those levels of pollution which 
cannot be exceeded without threatening adverse effects on human 
health.30 The secondary standards,31 designed to protect the "public 
welfare,"32 set an even stricter limit on the concentration of 
pollutants allowed in the air than do the primary standards. These 
standards are at the core of the Act, and from them many critical 
features of the Act emanate.33 The EPA promulgated NAAQS for 
six criteria34 pollutants in April of 1971.35 
Upon establishment of the air quality standards, the 1970 CAA 
called upon state agencies to develop state implementation plans 
(SIP's) which were to set out the methods to be used in attaining 
these standards.36 The Act set up a strict statutory timetable for 
both the adoption and implementation of the SIP's. Under this 
schedule, the EPA was to approve the states' final plans no later 
than July 31, 1972, and the states were required to attain the 
primary standard by July 31, 1975, subject to a two-year extension 
28. See note 4 supra. 
29. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-4 (1976) (recodified at 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (Supp. III 1979». See note 5 
supra. 
30. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (Supp. III 1979). 
31. Id. § 7409(b)(2). 
32. The term "public welfare" has been defined quite broadly. It is essentially an umbrella 
term which has numerous components including protection of property, agricultural produc-
tion, ecosystems, and aesthetics. Hays, Clean Air: From the 1970Act to the 1977 Amendments, 
17 DUQ. L. REV. 33, 35 (1978-79); Quarles, Federal Regulation of New Industrial Plants, 10 
ENVIR. REP. (BNA) (Monograph No. 28) 4 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Quarles]. 
33. Quarles, supra note 32, at 4. The Quarles article stated: 
Id. 
The standards define the quality of air which must be achieved to prevent adverse ef-
fects. Many critical features ofthe program originate from this foundation-including 
the basic point that control requirements depend on adequate data and analysis to de-
termine what the air quality actually is, to identify the sources of pollution affecting 
air quality and the manner in which pollutants are dispersed and interact in the ambi-
ent air, and to determine what reductions and controls are needed to achieve speci-
fied air quality objectives. 
34. "Criteria pollutants" are those pollutants in the ambient air which the EPA has deter-
mined to be safe at certain prescribed levels. These levels are the primary and secondary 
NAAQS. 
35. 40 C.F.R. §§ 50.4-50.11 (1980). The six criteria pollutants are: Total suspended par-
ticulates (TSP), sulfur dioxide, photochemical oxidants, hydrocarbons, carbon monoxide, and 
nitrogen oxide. Lead was added to this list in Oct. 1978. 40 C.F.R. § 50.12 (1980). 
36. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a) (Supp. III 1979). 
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under certain.conditions.37 In order to designate geographical units 
in which pollutant levels could be monitored, the country was divided 
into 247 air quality control regions (AQCR's).38 
Although the 1970 Act did not specify the consequences of failure 
to attain the primary NAAQS by the 1975 deadline, and since public 
health was made the sole consideration in setting such standards, 
one of the logical alternatives available to the EPA was to shut down 
those sources which failed to reduce emissions to acceptable levels. 
This remedy was specifically endorsed by the Senate committee 
report on the 1970 Amendments.39 However, this "all or nothing" 
approach was never adopted by most courts. Some courts simply 
refused to accept this approach,40 others tried to modify it,41 and 
37. 42 U.S.C. S 1857c-5(e) (1970). This section stated: 
(e) Extension of time period for attainment of national primary ambient air quality stand-
ard in implementation plan; procedure; approval of extension by Administrator. 
(1) Upon application of a Governor of a State at the time of submission of any plan im-
plementing a national ambient air quality primary standard, the Administrator may 
(subject to paragraph (2» extend the three-year period referred to in subsection 
(a)(2)(A)(i) of this section for not more than two years for an air quality control region if 
after review of such plan the Administrator determines that-
(A) one or more emission sources (or classes of moving sources) are unable to comply 
with the requirements of such plan which implement such primary standard because 
the necessary technology or other alternatives are not available or will not be avail-
able soon enough to permit compliance within such three-year period, and 
(B) the state has considered and applied as a part of its plan reasonably available 
alternative means of attaining such primary standard and has justifiably concluded 
that attainment of such primary standard within the three years cannot be achieved. 
(2) The Administrator may grant an extension under paragraph (1) only if he deter-
mines that the State plan provides for-
(A) application of the requirements of the plan which implement such primary stand-
ard to all emission sources in such region other than the sources (or classes) de-
scribed in paragraph (l)(A) within the three-year period, and 
(B) such interim measures of control of the sources (or classes) described in 
paragraph (l)(A) as the Administrator determines to be reasonable under the 
circumstances. 
This 1975 deadline and two-year extension applies only to the primary NAAQS. Since the 
secondary NAAQS have not been hotly contested to date, the term "NAAQS" will refer ex-
clusively to the primary standards for the balance of this article. 
38. 42 U.S.C. S 1857c-2 (1976). 
39. S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1970). The report stated: The committee 
determined that. . . the health of people is more important than the question of whether the 
early achievement of ambient air quality standards is technologically feasible . . . . 
Therefore, the committee determined that existing sources of pollutant should meet the stand-
ard of the law or be closed down. Quoted in Kramer, The 1977 Clean Air Amendments: A Tac-
tical Retreat From the Technology-Forcing Strategy?, 15 URB. L. ANN. 103, 105 n.8 (1978) 
[hereinafter cited as Kramer]. 
40. Duquesne Light Co. v. EPA, 522 F.2d 1186 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded, 427 
U.S. 902 (1976); St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. EPA, 508 F.2d 743 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated as moot, 
425 U.S. 987 (1976). 
41. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 483 F.2d 690 (8th Cir. 1973); Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 475 F.2d 968 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
556 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 9:549 
others essentially rewrote the 1970 Act.42 Also, in the 1976 case of 
Union Electric Co. v. EPA,43 Justice Powell, in a concurring opinion, 
found this shutdown alternative to be impractical, favoring a more 
balanced approach. 44 
In retrospect it appears that the 1970 Act may have been overly 
ambitious in its approach. By 1975, it became apparent that "despite 
significant progress,"45 this aggressive, "technology-forcing" 46 
strategy had not lead to any significant technological 
breakthroughsY As of August 31, 1975, of the 247 AQCR's in the 
nation, it was estimated that 132 did not attain the NP AAQS for par-
ticulate matter, and 35 failed to attain the NPAAQS for sulfur diox-
ide.48 The attainment levels for the other criteria pollutants were not 
any better.49 Thus, because of the inflexibility of the 1970 Act, the 
42. Buckeye Power, Inc. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 162 (6th Cir. 1973). In this case the court re-
jected the idea that the 1970 Act was based on the "all or nothing" approach, holding that Con-
gress, if it intended to shut plants down, would have stated so in the 1970 Amendments. 
43. 427 U.S. 246 (1976). 
44. In this opinion J. Powell stated: 
Environmental concerns, long neglected, merit high priority, and Congress proper-
ly has made protection of the public health its paramount consideration. . . . But the 
shutdown of an urban area's electrical service could have an even more serious im-
pact on the health of the public than that created by decline in ambient air quality. 
The result apparently required by this legislation in its present form could sacrifice 
the well being of a large metropolitan area through the imposition of inflexible 
demands that may be technologically impossible to meet and indeed may no longer 
even be necessary to the attainment of the goal of clean air. 
I believe that Congress, if fully aware of this Draconian possibility, would strike a 
different balance. 
Id. at 271-72 (1976). 
45. H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 207, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONGo & 
AD. NEWS 1077, 1286. 
46. By making primary NAAQS solely a health-based standard, the 1970 Amendments ex· 
plicitly rejected technological and economic constraints as considerations in achieving pollu-
tion abatement. This type of approach is commonly referred to as "technology-forcing." Since 
sources face possible forced closings if they fail to meet the health-based standard, this ap-
proach assumes that these industries will be forced to develop new technologies to reach these 
standards. The basic philosophy behind this approach was summed up by Senator Edmund S. 
Muskie (D. Maine) when he stated: "Predictions of technological impossibility or infeasibility 
are not sufficient as reasons to avoid tough standards and deadlines, and thus to compromise 
the public health . . . . Only a clear cut and tough public policy can generate the needed ef-
fort." Quoted in Bonine, The Evolution of'Technology-Forcing' In The Clean A ir Act, 6 ENVIR. 
REp. (BNA) (Monograph No. 21) 1 (1975). See generally, id.; La Pierre, Technology-Forcing 
and Federal Environmental Protection Statutes, 62 IOWA L. REV. 771 (1976-77). 
47. See Kramer, supra note 39, at 108 & n.26. 
48. Id. at 108 & n.27. 
49. See Letter from EPA Administrator Russell Train to Senator Edmund Muskie (May 12, 
1975) (attachment at 3), reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD NEWS 1077, 1286-87. The 
letter, dated May 12, 1975, assessed the attainment situation for the five criteria pollutants. 
1981] NOTICE AND COMMENT REQUIREMENTS 557 
EPA was faced with the possibility50 of shutting down plants and 
putting an end to growth in most of America's industrial areas, a 
price that the COurtS51 and the American public were unwilling to 
pay. 52 Prior to the 1977 Amendments, the EPA made an attempt to 
resolve the problem by publishing its "Offset Policy," an inter-
pretative ruling, on December 21, 1976.53 This ruling stated that 
new plants could be constructed in nonattainment areas only if emis-
sions were controlled to the greatest extent possible and if more than 
equivalent offsetting emission reductions were obtained from other 
sources. Thus, the EPA, under this policy, attempted to make room 
for economic growth in highly developed nonattainment areas as 
long as air quality was to be improved as a result of that growth. 
pollutants. While recognizing that its statistics were based on "less than adequate informa-
tion" it presented the following estimates: 
Of the 247 air quality control regions in the Nation, 60 are projected not to meet 
standards by statutory deadlines for TSP and 42 for sulfur oxides. For oxidants 74 air 
quality control regions have reported levels in excess of the national ambient air 
quality standards; it is expected that a high proportion of these air quality control 
regions will continue to have oxidant levels exceeding national ambient air quality 
standards past the attainment dates. A similar situation exists for nitrogen dioxide 
and carbon monoxide. Currently, 13 cities exceed the nitrogen dioxide national am-
bient air quality standards (and will probably continue to exceed it in the immediate 
future). Likewise, 54 cities are in this category for carbon monoxide. 
50. The shutdown approach was never explicitly stated in the 1970 Act, thereby leading to 
arguments over whether it was actually intended. See note 42 supra. However, the shutdown 
approach was generally accepted as the logical outcome of the technology-forcing strategy 
adopted by the CAA. Thus, while the EPA was not directly ordered to shut down plants in 
order to attain NP AAQS, such action was the most effective possible approach that the EPA 
could take in order to implement the 1970 Act. 
51. See notes 39-44 supra. 
52. Raffle, Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Non-Attainment Under The Clean 
Air Act-A Comprehensive Review, 10 ENVIR. REp. (BNA) (Monograph No. 27) 3 (1979). 
53. 40 C.F.R. S 51, app. S (1980). When the 1970 Act was originally passed, no attention 
was paid to new sources since it was generally assumed that the NAAQS would be reached 
by the target date. However, when it became clear in 1975 that this would not occur, the EPA 
was faced with the question whether the Clean Air Act was intended to stop new industrial 
development in nonattainment areas. The EPA in passing the Offset Ruling attempted to 
reconcile the conflicting concerns of clean air and economic growth. 
Specifically the Offset Ruling established four criteria necessary for approval of a new 
source in a nonattainment area. These criteria are as follows: 
1) the new source must contain pollution control devices able to assure the lowest achievable 
emission rate (LAER), which cannot be less stringent than any new source performance stand-
ard (see 42 U.S.C. S 7411 (Supp. III 1979»; 
2) all other sources owned by an applicant in that AQCR must be in compliance with the SIP 
requirements or on another approved schedule;. 
3) the applicant must reduce emissions generated by the new source after LAER, i. e., offset 
emissions; and 
4) the emission offsets must provide a positive net air quality benefit in the affected area. 
Quarles, Federal Regulation of New Industrial Plants, 10 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) (Monograph No. 
28) 16 (1979). 
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The legislative history of the 1977 Amendments also recognized 
and dealt with the problem of economic growth under the CAA. In 
its discussion of section 11764 of the House bill, the House Committee 
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce recognized the severe 
economic problems posed by the 1970 Act, and tried to strike a 
balance between these economic concerns and the health concerns 
which motivated enactment of the CAA.66 However, the reason for 
the failure to achieve timely compliance with the national standards 
was not simply the economic hardship placed on industry. According 
to then EPA Administrator Train, among the reasons for the failure 
were: a) the complexity of pollution abatement and unexpected prob-
lems such as the economic recession and energy crisis; b) inadequate 
enforcement and noncompliance by individual sources; c) inadequate 
state regulations; and d) numerous court challenges which pre-
vented federal or state enforcement action.66 In . light of this general 
background and these basic problems, Congress enacted the 1977 
Amendments. 
2. The 1977 Amendments 
Congress, in passing the 1977 Amendments, sought to rectify the 
problems arising from the 1970 Act. While the basic structure of the 
1970 Act was kept intact, various revisions were made in order to 
better address the problems discussed above. 
The legislative history of the 1977 Amendments makes it clear that 
"the primary and overriding purpose of the bill remain[ ed] the 
prevention of illness or death which is air pollution related and pro-
tection of public health."67 Efforts in Congress to change the 
primary NAAQS's to consider other factors such as economics, 
technology, and energy68 were ultimately rejected. The House report, 
in its discussion of both the nonattainment problem69 and its pro-
posal for prevention of significant deterioration (PSD),60 dwells at 
54. 42 U.S.C. S 7502 (Supp. III 1979). 
55. H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 210, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONGo & 
AD. NEWS 1077, 1289. 
56. Train Cites Clean Air Progress, Need For Continued Enforcement 2 (EPA Press 
Release, May 30,1975), reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 1077, 1286. 
57. H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. 
NEWS 1077, 1080. 
58. See Kramer, supra note 39, at 111 & n.44·46. 
59. H.R. REp. No. 294, supra note 57 at 207-10. U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 1286-89. 
60. [d. at 105-10, U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS at 1183-88. Prevention of Significant 
Deterioration (PSD) was promulgated as a final regulation by the EPA on August 7,1980.45 
Fed. Reg. 52,676 (1980) (to be codified at 40 C.F .R. n 51.24, 52.21). 
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great length on the severe health effects caused by air pollution in 
general, and nonattainment of the NPAAQS in particular.61 
The report discusses voluminous medical evidence,62 most of which 
pointed out the necessity of attaining NP AAQS in order to protect 
the public health, and urges that no delays or relaxation be allowed in 
the attainment dates.63 Pointing out the scope of the problem and 
the need for action, the report adds that: 
[NJon-attainment of air quality standards in a wide and densely 
populated region could result in a phenomenal health impact, 
measured in terms of millions of days of aggravated disease, 
asthma attacks and lower respiratory disease episodes. The 
committee points out that the people whose health is affected by 
air pollution number in the tens of millions.6( 
The committee's decision to reaffirm the health based standards was 
further supported by new evidence suggesting that the margins of 
safety, originally set to prevent the occurrence of known and an-
ticipated health effects, had turned out to be very modest or even 
nonexistent. 65 
The purpose of the PSD rules is to prevent significant deterioration of the air quality 
in areas where the air is cleaner than [required under] applicable national standards. 
Accordingly, PSD applies only in [those] areas which are either cleaner than [required 
by] the national standards, or unclassifiable, for at least one pollutant. 
Goldberg, Source Planning Under the New PSD Regulations, 10 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) (Mono-
graph No. 29) 2 (1980). 
61. H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 110-22, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONGo & 
AD. NEWS 1077, 1188-1200. 
62. Id. at 105-06, U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS at 1183-84. The medical evidence included 
testimony by the American Medical Association and the American Lung Association. Also, 
various unnamed studies were discussed. 
63.Id. 
64. Id. at 209, U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS at 1288. The magnitude of the health problem 
posed by air pollution had also been noted in the case law prior to the 1977 Amendments. One 
court noted the severity of this problem by stating: 
Acute episodes of high pollution have clearly resulted in mortality and morbidity 
. . . . [T]here is now no longer any doubt that high levels of pollution sustained for 
periods of days can kill. Those aged 45 and over with chronic diseases, particularly of 
the lungs or heart, seem to be predominantly affected. In addition to these acute 
episodes, pollutants can attain daily levels which have been shown to have serious 
consequences to city dwellers. 
There is a large and increasing body of evidence that significant health effects are 
produced by long-term exposures to air pollutants. 
Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. v. EPA, 572 F.2d 1150,1153 (6th Cir.), em. denied,439 
U.S. 910 (1978)(quoting RaIl, Review of the Health Effeets of Sulfur Oxides, 8 ENVT'L HEALTH 
PERSPECTIVES 97, 99 (1974». 
65. H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 106-10, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONGo & 
AD. NEWS 1077, 1185-88. The legislative history discussed a number of medical and scientific 
reports stating that the margins of safety, originally believed to be present in the NPAAQS, 
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Despite strong reaffirmance of the need for health based stand-
ards as the primary purpose of the Act, the 1977 Amendments did 
make certain concessions to accommodate legitimate concerns ex-
pressed by the business community. First, the Amendments pushed 
back the mandatory attainment date for NP AAQS from July 31, 
1975 to December 31, 1982 or "as expeditiously as practicable."66 In 
order to reach the 1982 goal, a strict statutory schedule was set 
under a new implementation process. This implementation process 
called for the classification of all AQCR's in the nation as either at-
tainment, nonattainment, or unclassifiable within 120 days of August 
7, 1977.67 Mter the states submitted their lists to the EPA, the Ad-
ministrator had until February 3, 1978, to "promulgate each such· 
list with such modifications as he deem[ed] necessary."68 Mter such 
lists were promulgated by the EPA, the states had until January 1, 
1979, to compose their revised State Implementation Plans (SIP's) 
under which their measures for assuring success in attaining the 
statutory deadlines were to be detailed.69 Thus, by postponing the at-
tainment date until 1982, the 1977 Amendments made certain con-
cessions to business. At the same time, by establishing a strict 
statutory deadline and discussing at length the severe health prob-
lems posed by air pollution, Congress made clear that the protection 
of public health remains the predominant goal of the CAA.70 
Another concession made to the business community was the con-
tinuance of the "Offset Policy" through July 1, 1979.71 The Offset 
Policy was designed to allow for continued economic growth in 
nonattainment areas, provided that continued progress was being 
made towards attainment of the NP AAQS. Continuance of this 
policy through mid-1979 allowed the states to permit economic 
growth while revising their SIP's to allow for similar activity in the 
future. Approval of new plants in nonattainment areas is still allowed 
were modest or even nonexistent, due to new evidence that potential for harmful health ef-
fects does exist at lower levels of pollution in the ambient air. 
66. 42 u.s.c. S 7502(a)(l) (Supp. III 1979). 
67. [d. § 7407(d)(I). 
68. [d. § 7407(d)(2). 
69. [d. S 7407(a), (a)(I). 
70. See text at note 57 supra. 
71. 42 u.s.c. S 7502 note (Supp. III 1979). The Offset Policy was originally enacted as a 
stopgap to the problem of economic stagnation in nonattainment areas. The 1977 Amend-
ments, in S 202, officially extended this interpretative ruling until June 1, 1979, at which time 
revised SIP's had to be adopted. While the 1977 Amendments did continue the basic policy of 
the Offset Ruling, one important change was made. This change dealt with the baseline levels 
of pollutants from which the offsets were measured. Essentially, this change liberalized the 
baseline levels, thereby making offsets easier to attain until June 1, 1979. 
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under the revised SIP's, provided that various conditions are met.72 
The legislative history on the House bill's section 12973 points out 
that the section has two main purposes: a) to allow for reasonable 
growth in a nonattainment area while also making reasonable prog-
ress towards attainment of the NPAAQS, and b) to allow states 
greater flexibility in furthering economic growth than the Offset 
Ruling affords.74 
The 1977 Act also calls for greater public and local government 
participation in air pollution decisions.75 Although the overriding 
purpose of the Act is clearly protection of public health, the 
legislative history reveals that one of the main purposes of the 1977 
Amendments was "to insure more effective, informed public involve-
ment in decision-making under the Act."76 Thus, the Amendments 
specifically require that revised SIP's be the product of cooperative 
consultation between state and local governments,77 with the state 
adopting and the EPA approving such plans only "after reasonable 
notice and public hearings."78 It is important to note that the section 
107 designations,19 classifying the nation's AQCR's as attainment, 
nonattainment, or unclassifiable for the various criteria pollutants, do 
not specifically call for reasonable notice and public hearings. In-
stead the section only requires that the Administrator, whenever he 
wishes to modify a list submitted by a state, notify the state and re-
quest all available information on the region. Section 107 also re-
quires that the Administrator provide the state with an opportunity 
to show why any proposed modifications are inappropriate. 80 
72. 42 U.S.C. § 7503. After June 1,1979, the 1977 Amendments intended that the revised 
SIP's (which had to be submitted to and approved by the EPA by this date under the 1977 
Amendments in order for new construction to be allowed) provide the framework for review of 
new sources in nonattainment areas. Basically, the same approach as that taken by the Offset 
Ruling is applied except that some new provisions were added which tighten restrictions on 
construction of new plants. The most important of these new provisions links approval of new 
sources to completion of revision of the entire SIP in order to eliminate violations. [d. 
§§ 7410(a)(2)(I), 7502(a)(1). The practical effect of this section makes new construction difficult 
in many nonattainment areas. 
For a good discussion of the 1977 Amendments' approach toward economic growth and new 
sources, see Quarles, supra note 32. 
73. 42 U.S.C. § 7503 (Supp. III 1979). 
74. H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 211, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONGo & 
AD. NEWS 1077, 1290. 
75. [d. at 2, U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS at 1079. 
76. [d. 
77. 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b)(9) (Supp. III 1979). 
78. [d. §§ 7502(b)(1), 7410(c). 
79. Hereinafter, they will be referred to as § 107 designations, S 107 regulations, or § 107 
lists. 
80. 42 U.S.C. S 7407(d)(2) (Supp. III 1979). 
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A new subsection, designed to deal with problems not adequately 
covered by the 1970 Act's judicial review provisions, was also in-
troduced in the 1977 Amendments. As the legislative history reveals, 
one of the major problems with the 1970 Act was the excessive 
amount of litigation which resulted from it and eventually delayed 
the statutory deadlines set within the Act.81 The House report on the 
1977 Amendments also recognized this problem stating that, in 
order to prevent rulemaking from bogging down over minor 
technical questions, the extent to which the Administrator's deci-
sions on procedural matters may be reversed during judicial review 
must be limited.82 To rectify this problem, new subsection 307( d)8S 
was enacted as part of the 1977 Amendments. This subsection con-
tains a provision, 307(d)(9), which establishes a new, more limited 
standard for judicial review of most agency rulemaking under the 
CAA. Subsection (d)(1) of section 307 expressly states that it applies 
to thirteen specific provisions of the Act84 as well as "such other ac-
81. See note 56 supra. 
82. H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. 
NEWS 1077, 1401. 
83. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d) (Supp. III 1979). 
84. Id. S 7607(d)(I). 
This subsection applies to-
(A) the promulgation or revision of any national ambient air quality standard under 
section 109 [42 U.S.C. § 7409], 
(B) the promulgation or revision of an implementation plan by the Administrator 
under section 110(c) [42 U.S.C. § 7410(c)], 
(C) the promulgation or revision of any standard of performance under section 111 
[42 U.S.C. § 7411] or emission standard under section 112 [42 U.S.C. 
S 7412], 
(D) the promulgation or revision of any regulation pertaining to any fuel or fuel ad-
ditive under section 211 [42 U.S.C. S 7545], 
(E) the promulgation or revision of any aircraft emission standard under section 231 
[42 U.S.C. § 7571], 
(F) promulgation or revision of regulations pertaining to orders for coal conversion 
under section 113(d)(5) [42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(5)] (but not including orders granting or 
denying any such orders), 
(G) promulgation or revision of regulations pertaining to primary nonferrous smelter 
orders under section 119 [42 U.S.C. § 7419] (but not including the granting or denying 
of any such order), 
(H) promulgation or revision of regulations under subtitle B of title I [42 U.S.C. §§ 
7450-7459] (relating to stratosphere and ozone protection), 
(I) promulgation or revision of regulations under subtitle C of title I [42 U.S.C. §§ 
7470-7491] (relating to prevention of significant deterioration of air quality and pro-
tection of visibility), 
(J) promulgation or revision of regulations under section 202 [42 U.S.C. S 7521] and 
test procedures for new motor vehicles or engines under section 206 [42 U.S.C. § 
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tions as the Administrator may determine."85 Among those provi-
sions listed are the promulgation or revision of SIP's by the Ad-
ministrator under section llO(c)86 and promulgation or revision of 
regulations related to PSD.87 However, subsection 307(d)(1) does 
not specifically list the promulgation of section 107(d) descriptions. 
Subsection 307(d)(9)(D) of the 1977 Amendments sets forth the 
standard under which a reviewing court may reverse a procedural 
violation by the EPA if such action is included in section 307(d)(1). 
The (d)(9)(D) standard, like all of section 307(d)(9), is quite limiting, 
its intent being the elimination of unnecessary litigation. Section 
307(d)(9)(D) gives a three-prong test for judicial reversal of pro-
cedural violations. This three-prong test requires that: 1) the viola-
tion must be arbitrary or capricious; 2) an objection to a procedure 
may be raised during judicial review only if the objection was raised 
during the public comment period; and 3) the error must be so 
serious and of such relevance to the rule that there is a substantial 
likelihood that the rule would have been significantly changed if such 
errors had not been made.88 Thus, section 307(d) in general and sec-
tion 307(d)(9)(D) specifically set out a very detailed procedure and 
standard for judicial review of agency rulemaking under the CAA. 
These standards are much more elaborate than those normally re-
quired under the AP A 89 and, thus, make invalidation of mere pro-
cedural errors difficult to attain in a reviewing court. This article 
now turns its attention to the AP A, discussing primarily those sec-
tions which deal with rulemaking procedure and judicial review. 
7525], and the revision of a standard under section 202(aX3) [42 U.S.C. § 7521(aX3)], 
(K) promulgation or revision of regulations for noncompliance penalties under section 
120 [42 U.S.C. § 7420], 
(L) promulgation or revision of any regulations promulgated under section 207 [42 
U.S.C. § 7541] (relating to warranties compliance by vehicles in actual use), 
(M) action of the Administrator under section 126 [42 U.S.C. § 7426] (relating to in· 
terstate pollution abatement), and 
(N) such other actions as the Administrator may determine. 
The provisions of sections 553 through 557 and section 706 of title 5 of the United States Code 
[5 U.S.C. SS 553-557, 706] shall not, except as expressly provided in this subsection, apply to 
actions to which this subsection applies. This subsection shall not apply in the case of any rule 
or circumstance referred to in subparagraphs (A) or (B) of subsection 553(b) of title 5 of the 
United States Code [5 U.S.C. § 553(bXA), (B)]. 
85. Id. § 7607(dX1)(N). 
86. Id. § 7607(dX1XB). 
87. Id. § 7607(d)(lXI). 
88. Id. S 7607(dX9). 
89. 5 U.S.C. S 706 (1976). See text at notes 121-27 infra. 
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B. TheAPA 
Like the CAA, the APA90 has a long, although quite different, 
legislative history.91 Although administrative agencies have been 
present in American government for well over 100 years,92 the in-
tensive growth of administrative regulation brought on by the New 
Deal made the need for organized administrative procedure quite 
great.93 The AP A was designed to settle and regulate the field of 
federal administrative procedure by setting forth legal guides outlin-
ing the "minimum basic essentials" required of agencies.94 Its cen-
tral purpose was "to afford parties affected by administrative 
powers a means of knowing what their rights are and how they may 
be protected. "95 
The section of the AP A with which this article is principally con-
cerned is section 553, entitled "Rulemaking."96 This section requires 
an agency which intends to promulgate rules,97 to publish a general 
90. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1976). The provisions of 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706, dealing with judicial 
review, were originally enacted as part of the Administrative Procedure Act. However, as 
part of a general revision of title 5, the Administrative Procedure Act was officially repealed 
on Sept. 6, 1966, and its provisions incorporated into 5 U.S.C. §§ 552-559 and §§ 701-706. 
While the Administrative Procedure Act is currently commonly cited as only §§ 551-559, for 
the purpose of this article it will be assumed to include §§ 701-706 as well. 
91. See generally H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1946] U.S. CODE 
CONGo & AD. NEWS 1195-1202. 
92. Id., reprinted in [1946] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 1195, 1197. 
93. The 1937 Report of the President's Committee on Administrative Management 
recognized this problem, pointing out that: 
There is a conflict of principle involved in [Agencies'] make-up and function. . . . 
They are vested with duties of administration . . . and at the same time they are 
given important judicial work . . . . Furthermore, the same men are obliged to 
serve both as prosecutors and as judges. This not only undermines judicial fairness, it 
weakens public confidence in that fairness. 
H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in [1946] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 
1195. 
94. S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in UNITED STATES CONGRESS, SENATE 
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 
1944-46, at 193 (1949) [hereinafter cited as LEGIS. HISTORY OF APA 1944-46]. 
95.Id. 
96. 5 U.S.C. S 553 (1976). 
97. The words "rule" and "rule-making" as used in the APA are defined in 5 U.S.C. § 
551(4), (5). These sections read as follows: 
(4) "rule" means the whole or a part of an agency statement of general or particular 
applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or 
policy or describing the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an agen-
cy and includes the approval or prescription for the future of rates, wages, corporate 
or financial structures or reorganizations thereof, prices, facilities, appliances, serv-
ices or allowances therefor or of valuations, costs, or accounting, or practices bearing 
on any of the foregoing; 
(5) "rule-making" means agency process for formulating, amending or repealing a 
rule. 
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notice of proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register,98 to afford an 
opportunity for interested persons to participate in the rulemaking 
by submitting written comments,99 and to adopt a general statement 
of the basis for and purpose of rules subsequently adopted. loo Sec-
tion 553 further requires that the publication of the rule be made at 
least thirty days before its effective date,lOl subject to three excep-
tions,102 and that each agency give an interested person the right to 
petition for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule.103 
The effect of section 553 is to: 
enable parties to express themselves in some informal manner 
prior to the issuance of rules and regulations, so that they will 
have been consulted before being faced with the accomplished 
fact of a regulation which they may not have anticipated or with 
reference to which they have not been consulted.104 
The section thus recognizes that interested persons and regulated in-
dustries have a right to participate in the rulemaking process. Fur-
thermore, it assumes that the quality of policy decisions will be im-
proved if public input is considered before decisions are made. l05 As 
Justice Douglas stated in his dissent in NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon, 106 
[a]gencies discover that they are not always repositories of 
ultimate wisdom; they learn from the suggestions of outsiders 
and often benefit from that advice . . . . Public airing of prob-
lems through rulemaking makes the bureaucracy more respon-
sive to public needs and is an important brake on the growth of 
absolutism in the regime that now governs all of US. 107 
98. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1976). 
99. [d. § 553(c). 
100. [d. 
101. [d. § 553(d). 
102. [d. 
103. The section reads as follows: 
(d) The required publication or service of a substantive rule shall be made not less than 30 
days before its effective date, except-
(1) a substantive rule which grants or recognizes an exemption or relieves a restriction; 
(2) interpretative rules and statements of policy; or 
(3) as otherwise provided by the agency for good cause found and published with the 
rule. 
[d. § 553(e). 
104. LEGIS. HISTORY OF AP A 1944-46, supra note 94, at 358. 
105. See Writers Guild of America, West, Inc. v. FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064 (C.D. Cal. 1976); 
Texaco, Inc. v. FPC, 412 F.2d 740,744 (3d Cir. 1969). 
106. 394 U.S. 759, 777-78 (1969). 
107. [d., quoted in Writers Guild of America, West, Inc. v. FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064, 1113 
n.76 (C.D. Cal. 1976). 
Although a dissenting opinion, Justice Douglas' comments are commonly cited as an accu-
rate account of the function of the § 553 notice and comment procedures in the administrative 
process. 
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However, despite the importance of public notice and participation 
in rulemaking, section 553 of the AP A lists numerous exceptions, 108 
two of which this article will deal with in detail. These two exceptions 
are commonly referred to as the "good cause" exceptions and they 
are found in subsections (bXB) and (dX3) of section 553.109 
1. The (bXB) Exception 
The (bXB) exception of section 553 deals with the preliminary 
notice of rulemaking that is normally required. Section 553(b) states 
that general notice of proposed rulemaking must be published in the 
Federal Register in order to alert interested parties that such rules 
are being formulated. However, section 553(bXB) states that, except 
when notice or hearing is required by statute, normal section 553(b) 
procedures do not apply "when the agency for good cause finds (and 
incorporates the finding and a brief statement of reasons therefore 
in the rules issued) that notice and public procedure thereon are im-
practicable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest."llo 
The legislative history of this exception makes it clear that it 
should be narrowly construed. The Senate report on the (bXB) excep-
tion is illuminating in this regard. It states: 
The exemption of situations of emergency or necessity is not 
an "escape clause" in the sense that any agency has discretion 
108. In all, § 553 contains seven exceptions. Three exceptions are contained in § 553(d). See 
note 102 supra. Two other exceptions are contained in § 552(a). These read as follows: 
(a) This section applies, according to the provisions thereof, except to the extent that there 
is involved-
(1) a military or foreign affairs function of the United States; or 
(2) a matter relating to the agency management or personnel or to public property, 
loans, grants, benefits, or contracts. 
The final two exceptions are contained in § 553(b)(3)(A) and 553(b)(3)(B). These read as follows: 
(b) General notice of proposed rule making shall be published in the Federal Register, 
unless persons subject thereto are named and either personally served or otherwise have 
actual notice thereof in accordance with law. The notice shall include-
(1) a statement of the time, place, and nature of public rule-making proceedings; 
(2) reference to the legal authority under which the rule is proposed; and 
(3) either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects 
and issues involved. 
Except when notice or hearing is required by statute, this subsection does not apply-
(A) to interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, 
procedure, or practice; or 
(B) when the agency for good cause finds (and incorporates the finding and a brief state-
ment of reasons therefor in the rules issued) that notice and public procedure thereon are 
impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest. 
109. 5 U.S.C. SS 553(b)(3)(B), 553(d)(3) (1976). 
110. Id. S 553(b)(3)(B). 
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to disregard its terms or the facts. A true and supported or sup-
portable finding of necessity or emergency must be made and 
published. "Impracticable" means a situation in which the due 
and required execution of the agency functions would be 
unavoidably prevented by its undertaking public rulemaking 
proceedings. "Unnecessary" means unnecessary so far as the 
public is concerned as would be the case if a minor or merely 
technical amendment in which the public is not particularly in-
terested were involved. "Public interest" supplements the 
terms "impracticable" or "unnecessary," it requires that public 
rulemaking procedures shall not prevent an agency from 
operating and that, on the other hand, lack of public interest in 
rulemaking warrants an agency to dispense with public pro-
cedure.Ill 
567 
The House report on this exception adds that " '[i]mpracticable' 
means a situation in which the due, timely, and required execution of 
agency functions would be unavoidably prevented by its undertaking 
public rulemaking proceedings." 112 Thus, while also endorsing a nar-
row construction of the exception, this part of the House report 
seems to take a slightly more liberal view than that taken by the 
Senate report. 
2. The (d)(3) Exception 
Whereas the (b)(B) exception deals with pre-promulgation notice, 
the (d)(3) exception relates to section 553's requirement that a rule 
must be published at least thirty days before its effective date. 113 
However, unlike (b)(B), the (d)(3) exception contains no qualifying 
language. It simply states that the thirty day period is not necessary 
where the agency has good cause to dispense with it and publishes its 
reason with the rule. Despite this difference in statutory language, 
most courts and commentators have taken the position that the two 
exceptions have roughly the same meaning,114 
111. S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in LEGIS. HISTORY OF APA 1944-46, 
supra note 94, at 200. 
112. H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in LEGIS. HISTORY OF APA 
1944-46, supra note 94, at 258. 
113. Section 553(d)(3), 5 U.S.C. § 553(d)(3) reads: 
(d) The required publication or service of a substantive rule shall be made not less than 30 
days before its effective date, except-
(3) as otherwise provided by the agency for good cause found and published with the 
rule. 
114. See 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 590 (2d ed. 1978); Bonfield, Public Par-
ticipation in Federal Rule-making Relating to Public Property, Loans, Grants, Benefits or 
Contracts, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 540, 599-600 (1970). 
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The purpose of the (dX3) exception must be viewed in light of the 
purpose of section 553(d) in general. Basically, section 553(d) is 
designed to "afford persons affected a reasonable time to prepare 
for the effective date of a rule or rules or to take any other action 
which the issuance of the rule may prompt."115 Early hearings on 
this section suggested that it was necessary in order to provide a pro-
cedure to correct error or oversight in regulations before, rather 
than after, they become effective.116 
Like the (bXB) exception, the (dX3) exception is not intended to be 
an escape clause which can be arbitrarily exercised. Its use must be 
based on legitimate grounds supported in law and fact.117 It is 
designed to let certain rules take effect immediately or in less than 
thirty days where unavoidable limitations of time, or demonstrable 
urgency of the conditions they are designed to correct, exist.118 The 
exception, and the section as a whole, requires agencies to proceed 
with the convenience or necessity of the people affected as their 
primary consideration.u9 Thus, it is clear that the (d)(3) exception is 
also intended to be narrowly construed. 120 
3. The Judicial Review Provision of the AP A -Section 706 
Another section of the AP A, relevant to the five circuit cases to be 
discussed in this article, is its scope of judicial review provision. This 
Also, the Courts of Appeals for the Third, Fifth, and D.C. Circuits interpreted these two ex-
ceptions to have roughly the same meaning. Sharon Steel Corp. v. EPA, 597 F.2d 377 (3d Cir. 
1979); U.S. Steel Corp. v. EPA, 595 F.2d207 (5th Cir. 1979); N.J. v. EPA, 626 F.2d 1038 (D.C. 
Cir. 1980). 
However, at least one case (U.S. Steel Corp. v. EPA, 605 F.2d 283 (7th Cir. 1979» has not 
accepted this view, finding the (d)(3) exception to set a broader standard than the (bXB) exeep-
tion does. [d. at 286. 
115. S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in LEGIS. HISTORY OF APA 1944-46, 
supra note 94, at 20l. 
116. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 79TH CONG., 1ST SESS., reprinted in 
REPORT ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT (Comm. Print 1945), LEGIS. HISTORY OF AP A 
1944-46, supra note 94, at 20. 
117. S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in LEGIS. HISTORY OF APA 1944-46, 
supra note 94, at 20l. 
118. H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in LEGIS. HISTORY OF AP A 
1944-46, supra note 94, at 260. 
119. 92 CONGo REC. 5650-51 (1946), reprinted in LEGIS. HISTORY OF APA 1944-46, supra 
note 94, at 359. 
120. It is universally accepted that the two good cause exceptions should be narrowly con-
strued. There does not appear to exist a view in opposition to the narrow construction inter-
pretation. However, there is some controversy as to how narrowly those exceptions should be 
construed. All courts which have considered the issue seem to recognize that too liberal an in-
terpretation would undermine the very purpose behind § 553. Yet, some sharp differences of 
opinion exist over what type of situation justifies the use of these exceptions. See text at notes 
122-291 infra. 
1981] NOTICE AND COMMENT REQUIREMENTS 569 
provision, section 706,121 sets out a standard of judicial review quite 
different from CAA section 307(dX9). The intent of APA section 706 
is to allow agencies as much discretion as possible in their day-to-day 
decision making while recognizing that ultimately it is the role of the 
courts, rather than the agencies, to decide questions of law.122 Thus, 
section 706 allows the reviewing court far greater discretion in 
reviewing agency action than does CAA section 307(d)(9), listing 
seven areas in which a reviewing court may overturn or compel an 
agency action. 123 
Of particular interest is section 706(2XD) which deals with judicial 
review of procedural violations. This section provides that a review-
ing court can "set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions 
found to be . . . without observance of procedures required by 
law."124 Section 706 provides further that, when making determina-
tions under this section, the whole record of those parts cited by a 
party should be carefully reviewed and "due account shall be taken 
of rule of prejudicial error."125 
The Senate report on subsection (2XD) adds little insight stating 
that, "[w]ithout observance of procedure required by law means not 
only the procedures required and procedural rights conferred by this 
bill but any other procedures or procedural rights the law may re-
121. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976). 
122. H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in LEGIS. HISTORY OF APA 
1944-46, supra note 94, at 278. 
123. Section 706 reads as follows: 
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall 
decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, 
and detennine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action. The 
reviewing court shall-
(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and 
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be-
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with 
law; 
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; 
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory 
right; 
(D) without observance of procedure required by law; 
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 556 and 557 of 
this title [5 USC §§ 556 and 557] or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency 
hearing provided by statute; or 
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de novo 
by the reviewing court. 
In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall review the whole record or 
those parts of it cited by a party, and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial 
error. 
124. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2XD) (1976). 
125. [d. § 706. 
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quire."126 Thus, the APA sets out a standard of judicial review of 
agency rulemaking, whereby any rule promulgated without observ-
ing required procedures can be invalidated upon a showing of prej-
udice by the injured party. This is clearly a much lower standard for 
judicial invalidation of agency rulemaking than that set forth in sec-
tion 307( d)(9)(D) of the CAA.127 
Since the key provisions of the CAA and AP A have now been 
outlined, this article will now undertake a discussion and analysis of 
the issues presented in the split among the five circuit courts of ap-
peal. The following section, Section III, will discuss in great detail 
the good cause issue, analyzing the split among the circuits in light 
of both the prior case law on these exceptions and the underlying 
policies of the CAA and AP A. Mter this discussion of the good 
cause issue, Part IV will discuss the various secondary issues 
presented by these five cases including the issues of harmless error, 
judicial review, and remedial relief. 
III. THE CASES-GoOD CAUSE 
In the 1977 Amendments to the CAA, Congress imposed a new 
and strict schedule for attaining primary NAAQS.128 The states 
were required under section 107(d)129 to submit to the Administrator 
126. S. REp. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in LEGIS. HISTORY OF APA 1944-46, 
supra note 94, at 214. 
127. See text at notes 81-89 supra. 
128. 42 U.S.C. S 7502(a)(1) (Supp. III 1979). See text at notes 67-70 supra. 
129. 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d) (Supp. III 1979) reads: 
(1) for the purpose of transportation control planning, part D (relating to nonattain-
ment) [42 U.S.C. SS 7501-7508], part C (relating to prevention of significant deteriora-
tion of air quality) [42 U.S.C. §S 7470-7479], and for other purposes, each State, within 
one hundred and twenty days after August 7, 1977 [the date of the enactment of the 
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977], shall submit to the Administrator a list, 
together with a summary of the available information, identifying those air quality 
control regions, or portions thereof, established pursuant to this section in such State 
which on August 7,1977-
(A) do not meet a national primary ambient air quality standard for any air pollutant 
other than sulfur dioxide or particulate matter; 
(B) do not meet, or in the judgment of the State may not in the time period required 
by an applicable implementation plan attain or maintain, any national primary am-
bient air quality standard for sulfur dioxide or particulate matter; 
(C) do not meet a national secondary ambient air quality standard; 
(D) cannot be classified under subparagraph (B) or (C) of this paragraph on the basis 
of available information, for ambient air quality levels for sulfur oxides or par-
ticulate matter; or 
(E) have ambient ail," quality levels better than any national primary or secondary air 
quality standard other than for sulfur dioxide or particulate matter, or for which 
there is not sufficient data to be classified under subparagraph (A) or (C) of this 
paragraph. 
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of the EPA a list designating their AQCR's as either attainment, 
nonattainment, or unclassifiable for the various criteria pollutants by 
December 5,1977.130 The Administrator of the EPA, in turn, was re-
quired to "promulgate each such list with such modifications as he 
deem[ed] necessary" by February 3, 1978.131 Using these modified 
lists, each state was to formulate a SIP by January 1, 1979132 in 
order to ensure attainment by 1982.133 
On March 3, 1978, one month late, the Administrator promulgated 
the modified list134 of nonattainment areas. 135 Despite the re-
quirements of section 553(b) and (c) of the APA,136 neither notice nor 
opportunity for public comment was provided for by the Ad-
ministrator. Furthermore, the list was promulgated as a "final rule" 
and was made effective immediately. Thus the normal procedure of 
section 553(d)137 was bypassed. As required by section 553, the Ad-
ministrator attached an explanation for his action which seemed to 
invoke both the (bXB) and (dX3) good cause exceptions. He mentioned 
the tight congressional schedule stating: 
(2) Not later than sixty days after submittal of the list under paragraph (1) of this 
subsection the Administrator shall promulgate each such list with such modifications 
as he deems necessary. Whenever the Administrator proposes to modify a list submit-
ted by a State, he shall notify the State and request all available data relating to such 
region or portion, and provide such State with an opportunity to demonstrate why any 
proposed modification is inappropriate. 
(4) Any region or portion thereof which is not classified under subparagraph (B) or (C) 
or paragraph (1) of this subsection. 
(5) A State may from time to time review, and as appropriate revise and resubmit, the 
list required under this subsection. The Administrator shall consider and promulgate 
such revised list in accordance with this subsection. 
130. [d. § 7407(d)(1). On the whole, the states submitted these lists in on time, although 
some states were between two weeks and two months late in SUbmitting these designations. 
See U.S. Steel Corp. v. EPA, 605 F.2d 283,289 (7th Cir. 1979) (stating that some states, such 
as Wisconsin, were almost two months late in SUbmitting their proposed designations); Oscar 
Meyer Co. v. Costle, 605 F.2d 559 (7th Cir. 1979) (decided with the U.S. Steel case-no pub-
lished opinion). 
131. 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d)(2) (Supp. III 1979). 
132. [d. § 129(c) of the 1977 Amendments (uncodified). The amendments required that the 
revised SIP's be submitted to the EPA by Jan. 1, 1979. They also required that the complete 
revision of these SIP's in nonattainment areas be completed by July 1, 1979. [d. S 172, 42 
U.S.C. S 7502. 
133. 42 U.S.C. § 7502(a)(1). 
134. The promulgated lists are published as rules in the Federal Register. Thus, for the pur-
poses of S 107(d) the term "promulgated lists" is synonymous with the terms "rules," "regula-
tions," and "designations." See note 15 supra. 
135. 40 C.F.R. S 81.300-.356 (1979). The EPA, in most instances, essentially accepted the 
states' lists of nonattainment designations, making only thirty-six minor modifications. 43 
Fed. Reg. 40,412 (1978). 
136. See text at notes 96-100 supra. 
137. See text at notes 101-02 supra. 
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The States are now preparing revisions to their State im-
plementation plans (SIP's) as required by Sections 1l0(aX2XI) 
and 172 of the Act. This enterprise, which must be completed by 
January 1, 1979, requires that the States have immediate 
guidance as to the attainment status of the areas designated 
under Sec. 107(d). Congress has acknowledged this by imposing 
a tight schedule on the designation process and requiring EPA 
to promulgate the list within 180 days of the enactment of the 
amendments. Under these circumstances, it would be imprac-
ticable and contrary to the public interest to ignore the statutory 
schedule and postpone publishing these regulations until notice 
and comment can be effectuated. For this good cause, the Ad-
ministrator has made these designations immediately 
effective.13s 
However, the Administrator did offer to receive post-hoc public 
comments stating: "The Agency recognizes . . . the importance of 
public involvement in the designation process. It is[,] therefore, 
soliciting public comment on this rule by May 2, 1978."139 
In response to this action by the EPA, suits were filed across the 
country, predominantly by large steel companies, claiming that their 
rights under the AP A had been violated.140 Of these suits, five were 
fully litigated in five different circuit courts of appeal. 141 The plain-
tiffs in these cases all claimed primarily that the EPA lacked good 
cause to bypass the procedures outlined in section 553 of the AP A. 
They therefore argued that the rules should be declared invalid until 
proper public notice and comment procedures could be conducted. 
In deciding whether the section 553 good cause exceptions were 
applicable, the circuits have split three to two, with the majority rul-
ing that the EPA did not have good cause to bypass the AP A.142 
In the process, these cases have raised further issues which have 
not been definitively settled. This section of the article will now 
analyze in some detail the good cause issue presented in these cases. 
First, the general approach of the prior case law on these two section 
553 exceptions will be discussed, trying to discern from it where the 
law stood at the time these five cases arose. Second, the actual ap-
proach taken by the five circuits on the good cause issue will be 
presented. Third, the split among the circuits over this issue will be 
138. See note 135 supra. 
139. [d. 
140. See note 14 supra. 
141. [d. 
142. The three circuits which failed to find good cause for EPA's action were the Third, 
Fifth, and D.C. Circuits. The Sixth and Seventh Circuits found that the EPA had properly 
utilized the good cause exceptions. 
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carefully analyzed, demonstrating the effects of this litigation on 
both the scope of the good cause exceptions and the implementation 
of the 1977 Amendments to the CAA as well. Following this presen-
tation of the good cause issue, Section IV of this article will discuss 
the various secondary issues raised in this litigation. 
A. Treatment of the Two Good Cause Exceptions in the Case Law 
The case law regarding the two good cause exceptions is generally 
confusing and particular trends of thought are difficult to discern 
from it. One major problem is that many of the cases fail to 
distinguish between the two exceptions143 and often mistakenly 
refer to them both as the "notice and public comment provisions"144 
or as the "thirty-day notice requirement."145 However, as indicated 
earlier,146 the two provisions are not alternatives, but are exceptions 
to two different procedural requirements under section 553. Sub-
sections (b) and (c) of section 553 provide an opportunity for the 
public to participate in rule making before an agency adopts a rule. 
Under the (bXB) exception, if an agency can show good cause, it can 
bypass this notice and public comment requirement. On the other 
hand, subsections (d) and (e) of section 553 provide the public with 
"an opportunity to prepare for the rule and to petition the agency for 
reconsideration."147 These requirements still exist even if good 
cause is found under (b )(B).148 Thus, under the (d)(3) exception, a rule 
can become effective immediately (as in the case here) or effective in 
less than thirty days only upon a showing of good cause. 
143. See, e.g., Kelly v. Dept. of Interior, 339 F. Supp. 1095 (E.D. Cal. 1972) (three judge 
court) (the (b)(B) exception was invoked by the agency yet the case involves a regulation which 
was made immediately effective); Reeves v. Simon, 507 F.2d 455 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1974) 
(the rule was made immediately effective yet the court found good cause under the (b)(B) ex-
ception). 
144. Reeves v. Simon, 507 F.2d 455 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 
991 (1979). 
145. United States v. Gavrilovic, 551 F.2d 1099, 1104 n.9 (8th Cir. 1977); see generaUy 
Lanctot, The 'Good Cause' Exceptions: Danger to Notice and Comment Requirements Under 
the Administrative Procedure Act, 68 GEO. L. J. 765, 771-72 (1980)[hereinafter cited as Lanc-
tot]. 
146. See text at notes 109-20 supra. 
147. Lanctot, supra note 145, at 77l. 
148. S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in LEGIS. HISTORY OF APA 1944-46, 
supra note 94, at 201. In this document, the Senate Judiciary Committee reported that S 
553(d) "does not provide procedures alternative to notice and other public proceedings re-
quired by the prior subsections of this section [§ 553(b) and (c)] .... Where public procedures 
are omitted as authorized in certain cases, [subsection (d)] does not thereby become in-
operative." Quoted in Lanctot, supra note 45, at 771 n.56. 
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Although many courts have muddled this difference, they are vir-
tually unanimous in agreeing that these two section 553 exceptions 
have roughly the same scope or meaning.149 It is interesting to note 
that this is true despite the fact that the (b XB) exception contains 
qualifying language that the (dX3) exception does not contain.160 In 
the five cases concerning the validity of the EPA's section l07(d) 
designations, both exceptions are involved since no notice and oppor-
tunity for public comment was given and the rule was made im-
mediately effective by the EPA. 
While there is some confusion over the applicability and scope of 
the two good cause exceptions, most courts tend to agree that they 
both (as well as all seven section 553 exceptions)161 should be narrow-
ly construed.162 The courts recognize the fact that the procedural 
safeguards outlined in section 553 are an extremely important 
means of participatory democracy which make rulemaking much 
more comprehensive and sensitive to the needs of all parties con-
cerned.163 Therefore, the courts do not want to see the good cause 
exceptions utilized whenever an agency merely finds it inconvenient 
to follow the procedures of the AP A. The legislative history of the 
AP A tried to give the courts some guidance on this issue: 
It will thus be the duty of reviewing courts to prevent 
avoidance of the requirements of [the APA] by any manner or 
form of indirection, and to determine the meaning of the words 
and phrases used. For example, in several provisions, the ex-
pression "good cause" is used. The cause so specified must be in-
terpreted by the context of the provision in which it is found and 
the purpose of the entire section and bill. Cause found must be 
real and demonstrable. i64 
However, as the case law reveals, courts have had a real problem in 
reaching a consensus as to how narrowly these exceptions should be 
construed and what fact situations constitute "real and 
demonstrable" good cause. 
149. See text at note 114 supra. 
150. See text at notes 113-14 supra. 
151. See note 108 supra. 
152. American Bus Ass'n v. United States, 627 F.2d 525 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Nat'l Nutritional 
Foods Ass'n v. Kennedy, 572 F.2d377 (2d Cir.1978); American Iron & Steellnst. v. EPA, 568 
F.2d 284 (3d Cir. 1977). 
153. See Sannon v. United States, 460 F. Supp. 458, 463-64 (S.D. Fla. 1978). 
154. S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 217 (1946), reprinted in LEGIS. HISTORY OF AP A 
1944-46, supra note 94, at 217. 
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1. The Construction of the Good Cause Exceptions in 
Cases Prior to 1970 
575 
The case law on the good cause exceptions can be loosely divided 
into historical periods for the purpose of this analysis. The first time 
period contains those cases which were decided before the Economic 
Stabilization Act of 1970.166 These early cases tend to reflect the con-
fusion and lack of uniformity which is characteristic of this area. One 
line of these pre-1970 cases adopted the view that a mere conclusory 
statement of good cause was sufficient to invoke the exception. The 
most frequently cited of these cases is Allegheny Airlines v. Village 
of Cedarhurst. 166 At issue in this case was a rule, adopted without 
notice and comment, which increased the amount of air traffic over 
the Village of Cedarhurst. The statement accompanying the rule 
stated simply that it was "adopted without delay in order to promote 
safety of the flying public." The court upheld the validity of the rule, 
concluding that the statement was sufficient to make section 553 
rulemaking impracticable and contrary to the public interest.167 
During this same time period, however, another line of cases re-
fused to uphold application of the exceptions merely on the basis of 
conclusory statements.16S Instead, in these cases, the court looked 
much more carefully at the issues involved in order to see if good 
cause actually did exist. For example, in Kelly v. Dept. of Interior, 169 
the court invalidated a Department of Interior regulation which con-
tained a conclusory statement as an explanation for invoking the 
(bXB) exception.160 The court reasoned as follows: 
155. Pub. L. No. 91·379, 84 Stat. 799 (1970) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1904 (Supp. II 1972». 
This act, designed to cure the nation's economic woes of the late 1960's and early 1970's, 
marked a significant turning point in the case law on the two good cause exceptions. See text 
at notes 163·82 infra. 
156. 132 F. Supp. 871 (E.D.N.Y. 1955). 
157. [d. at 884; see Harry H. Price and Sons, Inc. v. Hardin, 299 F. Supp. 557, 559-60 (N.D. 
Tex. 1969), vacated on other grounds, 425 F.2d 1137, 1139 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 
U.S. 1009 (1971). The court upheld the validity of a regulation promulgated by the Secretary 
of Agriculture without following normal § 553 procedures, finding a conclusory statement suf-
ficient to justify the Secretary's use of the good cause exceptions. 
158. See Texaco, Inc. v. FPC, 412 F.2d 740 (3d Cir. 1969); Kelly v. Dept. of Interior, 339 F. 
Supp. 1095 (E.D. Cal. 1972Xthree judge court); Hotch v. United States, 212 F.2d 280 (9th Cir. 
1954). 
159. 339 F. Supp. 1095 (E.D. Cal. 1972) (three judge court). 
160. The explanation read: 
Notice of proposed rule-making procedure is being waived since the amended 
regulations are necessitated by and in conformity with federal statute, and it is 
desirable that there be no further delay in the beneficial effect of the Act of August 
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While this notice contains an implicit "finding" that further 
delay would have prejudiced the Act's beneficiaries, it mentioned 
no supporting "reasons." The Secretary argues that over a year 
had already elapsed between the time Congress had amended 
the Act and he had changed his regulations, but neither he nor 
the notice explains why an additional 30 days was critical. . . . 
. . . [A] meaningful pre-publication dialogue between the 
plaintiffs and the Secretary may have even avoided this lawsuit. 
In our opinion, therefore, the 30-day comment period should be 
closely guarded and the "good cause" exception sparingly 
used. 161 
Thus, the court in Kelly took a much narrower view of the good 
cause exceptions than did the court in Allegheny A irlines. 162 
2. The Construction of the Good Cause Exceptions in Cases 
Involving the ESA 
With the passage of the Economic Stabilization Act (ESA) in 
1970,163 a whole new line of cases involving the section 553 good 
cause exceptions emerged.164 Throughout Phases I and II of the 
Economic Stabilization Program165 regulations promulgated by the 
Price Commission were issued without publication of a notice of pro-
posed rulemaking and virtually all were made effective either 
retroactively or on the date of publication. 166 When these regulations 
18, 1958, supra, as amended. Therefore, the amended regulation will become effec· 
tive on the date of publication in the FEDERAL REGISTER. 
[d. at 1101. 
161. [d. at 1101-02 (citations omitted). 
162. See also note 157 supra. 
163. See note 155 supra. 
164. United States v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., Inc., 342 F. Supp. 272 (D. Md. 1972); 
National Helium Corp. v. FEA, 569 F.2d 1137 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1978); DeRieux v. Five 
Smiths, Inc., 499 F.2d 1321 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.), eert. denied, 419 U.S. 896 (1974); Reeves 
v. Simon, 507 F.2d 455 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1974), eert. denied, 420 U.S. 991 (1975); Nader 
v. Sawhill, 387 F. Supp. 1208 (D.D.C. 1974), ajJ'd, 514 F.2d 1064 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 
1975); Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. FEA, 447 F. Supp. 1135 (D. Kan. 1978); Shell Oil Co. v. 
FEA, 527 F.2d 1243 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1975); Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Sawhill, 
393 F. Supp. 639 (D.D.C.), ajJ'd sub nom., Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Zarb, 523 F.2d 1404 
(Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1975). This list of cases is not intended to be exhaustive. Rather it con-
tains the most commonly cited cases for the purposes of this article. 
165. The Economic Stabilization Program was comprised of various actions by the federal 
government, authorized under the Economic Stabilization Act, to deal with the nation's 
economic woes at that time. Among the actions taken by President Nixon under the Economic 
Stabilization Act were wage and price controls-commonly known as Phase I and Phase II 
wage and price controls. 
166. E.g., DeRieux v. Five Smiths, Inc., 499 F.2d 1321 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.), eert. 
denied, 419 U.S. 896 (1974); Reeves v. Simon, 507 F.2d 455 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1974), eert. 
denied, 420 U.S. 991 (1975). 
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were challenged, the courts, unlike in the pre-1970 cases,167 were vir-
tually unanimous in finding that good cause existed. In the vast ma-
jority of these cases, the courts found that prior notice and comment, 
as well as a thirty day pre-effectiveness period, would undermine the 
goals that the regulations sought to achieve. 
A commonly cited case in this group is DeRieux v. Five Smiths, 
Inc. 16s In this case, the Atlanta Falcons, a professional football team, 
was sued for violating the ESA by playing games during the Phase I 
price freeze169 at prices exceeding those of the year before. The 
Falcons challenged the Executive Order170 which froze prices, claim-
ing it was issued without following the procedures of section 553. 
The Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals (TECA) held the good 
cause exception to be applicable in this situation. It reasoned that, 
"[h]ad advance notice issued, it is apparent that there would have en-
sued a massive rush to raise prices and conduct 'actual transactions' 
-or avoid them-before the freeze deadline. Each price increase 
would have generated further increase in a growing spiral of infla-
tion .... "171 The court found good cause to exist despite the fact 
that the Executive Order did not contain a statement of reasons for 
invoking the exception as required by section 553(b XB). The court 
concluded that Congress did not intend a technical violation, like the 
one included in this case, to affect the outcome where the reasons for 
the exception were so obvious and compelling.172 
Another commonly cited case from this time period is Reeves v. 
Simon.173 This case, also argued before the Temporary Emergency 
Court of Appeals, involved the validity of regulations issued by the 
Federal Energy Office (FEO) which prohibited retail gasoline sta-
tions from reserving part or all of their monthly gasoline allocation 
for sale exclusively to their regular customers. This rule was made 
effective immediately. In its statement of good cause, appended to 
the regulations, the FEO stated that normal rulemaking procedure 
under section 553(d) was impracticable because "serious alterations 
in established business practice" were occurring, resulting in "certain 
purchasers being served while others were being wholly 
167. See text at notes 155-62 supra. 
168. 499 F.2d 1321 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App), eert. denied, 419 U.S. 896 (1974). 
169. See note 165 supra. 
170. Executive Orders are subject to the provisions of the AP A, just as any administrative 
rulemaking. 
171. 499 F.2d 1321,1332 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.), eert. denied, 419 U.S. 896 (1974). 
172. [d. at 1333. 
173. 507 F.2d 455 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1974), eert. denied, 420 U.S. 991 (1975). 
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excluded."174 The FEO determined that these regulations were 
needed to give "immediate guidance and information with respect to 
the mandatory petroleum allocation and price regulations."176 In 
upholding the FEO's use of the (d)(3) exception, the TECA cited 
DeRieux stating that this conclusion is based upon facts so obvious 
that they may be judicially noticed.176 It concluded that "[t]he 
gasoline shortage was a temporary, but highly disruptive, national 
emergency. The long lines and violence required immediate 
action." 177 
A third case in which an agency's use of the good cause exception 
was upheld is Nader v. Sawhill.178 Nader involved a regulation 
issued by the Cost of Living Council (the predecessor of the Federal 
Energy Administration (FEA)) which allowed an increase in the ceil-
ing price of "old" crude oil. As in the Reeves case, this rule was made 
immediately effective. The FEA determined there "was an im-
mediate need for action to provide production incentives for 
domestic producers in view of the Arab oil embargo and that ad-
vance notice of a price increase would affect sales and deliveries 
adversely during an increasingly difficult period of supply."179 The 
TECA found the good cause exception applicable despite the fact 
that the regulation at issue had been accompanied by only a con-
clusory statement.180 It concluded that this technical violation did 
not warrant reversal, "considering the expeditious nature of the pro-
ceedings and that good cause in fact was present";181 however, it 
warned that repeated technical noncompliance would not be 
tolerated. Thus in Nader, as in this whole line of cases, the court 
looked behind a conclusory statement of good cause in order to 
determine if good cause did in fact exist. The courts, unlike in the 
pre-1970 cases, were willing to evaluate for themselves the cir-
cumstances existing at the time the regulation was promulgated and 
174. [d. at 458 (quoting from FED decision to dispense with the thirty-day notice period). 
175. [d. 
176. [d. at 459 (quoting DeRieux v. Five Smiths, Inc., 499 F.2d 1321, 1332 (Temp. Emer. 
Ct. App.), eert. denied, 419 U.S. 896 (1974». 
177. Reeves v. Simon, 507 F.2d 455, 459 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1974), eert. denied, 420 
U.S. 991 (1975). 
178. 387 F. Supp. 1208 (D.D.C. 1974), affd, 514 F.2d 1064 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1975). 
179. [d. at 1209. 
180. 514 F.2d 1064 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1975). 
The Cost of Living Council's (CLC) statement said merely that good cause was justified due 
to the need "to provide immediate guidance and information with respect to the decisions of 
the Council." [d. at 1068. 
181. 514 F.2d 1064, 1068-69 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1975). 
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the purpose of the Act under which it was promulgated in making 
their determinations. 182 
3. The Construction of the Good Cause Exceptions in 
Cases Involving Express Deadlines 
Another line of good cause cases are those dealing with express 
deadlines.183 Most of these cases have arisen in the mid-1970's and, 
unlike the cases involving the ESA, have had mixed results. One of 
the earliest of these cases involving an express deadline was Clay 
Broadcasting Corp. v. U.S. 184 That case involved Federal Communi-
cations Commission (FCC) regulations which altered a cable TV 
license fee schedule.185 Just before the FCC passed these regula-
tions, Congress made clear that it wanted the Commission to become 
more self-sustaining and wanted the new fee schedule to cover as 
much of fiscal year 1971 as possible.186 Because of this time con-
straint, the FCC complied with the section 553(b) and (c) notice and 
comment procedures, but made the rule effective only twenty-four 
days after its publication.187 This raised the issue whether the Com-
mission's use of the (d)(3) exception, allowing a regulation to become 
effective in less than thirty days, was applicable in this situation. In 
allowing the FCC's use of the (dX3) exception, the Fifth Circuit held 
that good cause existed to bypass normal section 553( d) procedure 
because the Commission, in accordance with congressional direc-
tives, wanted the fee schedule to cover as much of fiscal 1971 as 
reasonably possible.188 The court also reasoned that widespread 
182. See Tasty Baking Co. v. Cost of Living Council, 395 F. Supp. 1367, 1394 (E.D. Pa. 
1975); see text at note 154 supra. 
183. The term "express deadline" as used in this section refers to timetables mandated by 
Congressional agencies or the courts in some form. These timetables are used as a basis for 
bypassing § 553 procedures. 
184. 464 F.2d 1313 (5th Cir. 1972), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Nat'l Cable Television 
Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 415 U.S. 336 (1974). 
185. 47 C.F.R. § 74.1125 (1972). The concept of user charges for services such as cable tele-
vision was explicitly authorized by Congress in the Independent Offices Appropriation Act of 
1952. (31 U.S.C. § 483(a) (1976». The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) adopted its 
first fee schedule under this act in 1963 (Report and Order: Fees, 34 F.C.C. 811 (1963» and, in 
the case at hand, was attempting to revise broadly its fee schedule. 
186. Clay Broadcasting Corp. v. United States, 464 F.2d 1313,1316 (5th Cir. 1972), rev'd on 
other grounds sub nom., Nat'l Cable Television Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 415 U.S. 336 
(1974). 
187. The rule was published in the Federal Register on July 8, 1971, and became effective 
on August 1, 1971. 
188. 464 F.2d 1313, 1320 (5th Cir. 1972). 
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notice would actually be provided the affected parties and a first-of-
the-month effective date was required for administrative proportion 
of yearly fees. 1s9 Thus, while also basing its decision on other factors, 
the court in Clay Broadcasting found that a congressionally imposed 
time constraint did justify use of the section 553(d)(3) good cause ex-
ception. 
A recent case in which a deadline was a contributing factor in find-
ing good cause is Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. FEA.190 In Energy 
Reserves, the Federal Energy Administration promulgated regula-
tions which exempted stripper wells from oil price controls. These 
regulations, issued without notice and comment and made im-
mediately effective, were required by Congress to be promulgated 
not later than fifteen days after the enactment of the Emergency 
Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973 (EP AA).191 In upholding the 
FEA's good cause claim the court stated: 
In view of the legislative requirement of expeditious promulga-
tion by [FEA] implementing. . . EP AA, and of the necessity to 
quickly decontrol stripper lease prices once Congress' intent to 
do so was statutorily mandated in order that oil not be held off 
the market in anticipation of such price increases . . . , . . . 
"good cause" existed for the [FEA's] failure to follow APA 
notice and comment procedures.192 
Thus, as in Clay Broadcasting, the presence of congressional intent 
to have the regulations promulgated in a relatively short period of 
time was held to justify use of section 553 good cause exception. 
Another case which involved time constraints is Shell Oil Co. v. 
FEA.193 In that case the court failed to find good cause to bypass 
normal section 553 rulemaking procedures when the FEA issued 
regulations under the ESA194 controlling the amount that a lessor 
may be charged as rent for real property used in the retailing of 
189. [d. 
190. 447 F. Supp. 1135 (D. Kan. 1978). 
191. 15 U.S.C. S 753(a) (Supp. V 1975). 
192. 447 F. Supp. 1135, 1150 (D. Kan. 1970) (citations omitted). 
193. 527 F.2d 1243 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1975). 
194. In actuality the regulations were issued under the Emergency Petroleum Allocation 
Act of 1973,15 U.S.C. SS 751-760h (Supp. V 1975). However, the power to issue regulations 
limiting rents used in retailing gasoline originally came from Phase IV of the Economic Stabili-
zation Program under the ESA and was transferred to FEA from the Cost of Living Council. 
Thus, "rEA recognized that with the expiration, on April 30, 1974, of the Economic Stabiliza-
tion Act of 1970, ... its authority to regulate all rents charged for any real property used in 
connection with retailing gasoline had ended." 527 F.2d 1243, 1245 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 
1975). 
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gasoline195 without section 553 notice and comment procedures. The 
FEA claimed good cause existed for bypassing these normal pro-
cedures because the ESA was about to expire and it wanted to avoid 
a period of decontrol over rents. Despite the importance of this 
regulation in stabilizing gasoline prices,196 the court declared it in-
valid because it was promulgated without proper section 553 pro-
cedures. The court stated that "the expiration of the [ESA] was not 
so unexpected as would have precluded advance notice by the FEA 
of its own proposed regulations for controlling rents and accepting 
comments thereon prior to April 30, 1974 [the expiration date of the 
ESA]."197 It reasoned that, by waiting until near the expiration date 
of the E SA, the FEA essentially forced interested parties to bear the 
burden of compliance and denied them the opportunity to comment 
except by bringing a lawsuit. 198 
Two other cases in which the presence of express timetables were 
held not to justify the use of the section 553 good cause exceptions 
are Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Sawhill199 and American Iron 
and Steel Institute v. EPA.200 Consumers Union involved an FEA in-
terim price regulation for unleaded gasoline201 which was pro-
mulgated without notice and comment procedures. The EPA, in 
January of 1973, had required that unleaded gas be made generally 
available by July 1, 1974, yet FEA waited until May 24,1974, to pro-
195. 10 C.F.R. § 212.101-03 (1975). 
The regulations were actually issued on April 30, 1974, but were printed in the Federal 
Register on May 1, 1974. 
196. The FEA regulation noted the direct effect that the price of rented property used in 
the retailing of gasoline has on gasoline prices. The regulation stated that: 
The leasing of property used in the retailing of gasoline, between suppliers and 
retailers, is inextricably woven into the fabricof the supplier's marketing system and 
is directly related to the price at which gasoline is sold at retail. The price charged for 
product and the rent charged for the property, each of which is often expressed as a 
flat rate in cents per gallon, constitute a combined charge to the retailer by the sup-
pliers for the purchasing and retailing of gasoline. FEO has determined that the 
statutory mandate to regulate the price of refined petroleum products requires the 
continued regulation of rents charged between retailers and suppliers in service sta-
tion leases, as an integral part of its petroleum pricing regulations. 
527 F.2d 1243,1245 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1975), quoting from, 39 Fed. Reg. 15,139-40. 
197. 527 F.2d 1243, 1248 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1975). 
198. Id. 
199. 393 F. Supp. 639 (D.D.C.), affd sub nom., Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Zarb, 523 
F.2d 1404 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1975). 
200. 568 F.2d 284 (3d Cir. 1977). 
201. 10 C.F.R. § 212.112 (1975). "This regulation permitted refiners who did not sell 
unleaded gasoline on May 15, 1973, to sell unleaded gasoline at the same price as premium 
grade leaded gasoline." 393 F. Supp. 639, 640 n.l (D.D.C. 1975). 
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mulgate this regulation. In rejecting FEA's claim that use of the sec-
tion 553(bXB) exception was necessary because of the time con-
straints posed by the July 1 deadline, the district court noted that 
there was more than one year between the passage of the EPA 
regulation and the final deadline. It further noted that since FEA 
had almost six months to act202 "the emergency gasoline shortage 
... [did] not ... rise to the level of good cause."203 Similarly, 
American Iron & Steel involved regulations issued by EPA on March 
29, 1976, without a notice and comment period or a thirty day pre-
effectiveness period.204 A district court order205 required that the 
regulations at issue be promulgated no later than March 15, 1976. In 
overturning the EPA's use of the section 553(bXB) and (dX3) good 
cause exceptions, the Third Circuit pointed out that the EPA had 
known of its duty to promulgate these regulations for almost three 
years.206 
In Consumers Union, American Iron & Steel, and Shell Oil the 
courts held that the existence of an express deadline will not, in and 
of itself, constitute good cause to uphold a regulation promulgated 
without normal section 553 procedures. The courts in all three cases 
noted that the agencies had been aware of their deadlines for a 
substantial period of time before they acted. These cases clearly 
demonstrate that the key element in a good cause case involving an 
express deadline is the length of time that the agency has known of 
the pending deadline. In the cases in which the courts failed to find 
good cause to bypass section 553 procedures, the agencies had 
anywhere from six months to three years to promulgate the regula-
tions in question. Conversely, in those cases where good cause was 
found,207 the agencies had only a few weeks or months to act. Those 
cases illustrate that a finding of good cause will not be made by a 
court when an agency has had a substantial amount of time to follow 
202. While the EPA regulation was issued in January of 1973, FEA did not receive authori-
ty to pass such regulation until the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973 (15 U.S.C. 
SS 751-760h (Supp. V 1975» became law on Jan. 15, 1974. However, this still left FEA with 
almost six full months before the July 1 deadline to pass the regulation. 
203. 393 F. Supp. 639, 641 (D.D.C. 1975). 
204. The regulations, dealing with certain manufacturing processes within the iron and 
steel industry, "established maximum permissible quantities of pollutant which may be 
discharged by operations performing the designated processes." 568 F.2d 284, 289 (3d Cir. 
1977). 
205. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Reg. Comm'n, 539 
F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1976), vacated on other grounds, 434 U.S. 1030 (1978). 
206. 568 F .2d 284, 292 (3d Cir. 1977). The EPA's knowledge of its duty to promulgate these 
regulations dated back to November 11, 1973. 
207. See text at notes 184-92 supra. 
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normal section 553 rulemaking procedures and still meet its 
stipulated deadline. 
It is clear from this discussion that the case law on the section 553 
good cause exceptions, prior to the five circuit cases involving sec-
tion 107(d) designations, is quite muddled and confusing. However, 
some trends in the law can be discerned from these cases. First, 
most courts currently refuse to take the position that a mere con-
clusory statement is sufficient to justify the use of a section 553 good 
cause exception. Instead, most courts now follow the position taken 
by the Senate report on section 553,208 concluding that the reasons 
given by an agency for invoking a good cause exception must be 
"real and demonstrable. "209 Thus, most courts now require that a 
documented statement which briefly outlines the reasons for invok-
ing a good cause exception accompany a regulation which is pro-
mulgated without following normal section 553 procedures. Second, 
the cases involving the ESA demonstrate that where a sense of 
urgency and immediacy is present, especially where the national 
economy is involved, a court is likely to find good cause to bypass 
normal rulemaking procedures. Finally, the express deadline cases 
reveal that the length of time that an agency has known of and can 
prepare for an impending deadline is the key factor in determining 
whether the use of a good cause exception is justified. 
This article will now turn to a discussion of the approaches taken 
on the good cause issue by the five circuit cases involving the section 
107(d) designations. These five cases will be carefully analyzed, ex-
amining how the trends in the case law on these section 553 excep-
tions affected the outcome of these circuit court opinions. In addi-
tion, those factors which lead the courts to split three to two on this 
important issue will be discussed in detail. 
B. The Approach of the Five Circuit Cases Involving 
Section 107(d) Designations on the Good Cause Issue 
Largely as a result of this somewhat muddled background, the five 
cases to be discussed in this section split three to two on the section 
553 issue with the majority failing to find good cause for the EPA's 
action. As seen earlier,210 these five cases involved the validity of 
regulations, issued by the EPA without notice and comment pro-
cedures and made immediately effective, designating various 
208. See note 154 supra. 
209. See text at note 154 supra. 
210. See text at notes 128-42 supra. 
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regions of the country as attainment, nonattainment, or 
unclassifiable for the six criteria pollutants listed in the regulations 
under the CAA. In this split among the circuits, there appears to be a 
difference in approach taken by the courts in reviewing the good 
cause exceptions. In those circuits which failed to find good cause, 
the courts tended to view the EPA's argument as being based solely 
on the importance of the statutory schedule and the need to give im-
mediate guidance to the states. 211 However, in those circuits which 
found good cause, the courts took a closer look at the overall situa-
tion. They placed greater emphasis on such long-range factors as the 
long history of delay in attaining healthy air in America and the 
numerous health effects related to this delay. 
The first case decided in this battle over the EPA's implementa-
tion of the 1977 Amendments was Sharon Steel Corp. v. EPA,212 a 
Third Circuit case. In this case, both Sharon Steel Corporation and 
Bethlehem Steel Corporation challenged the EPA's determination in 
its March 3, 1978, rule that four AQCR's in Pennsylvania213 were 
nonattainment for particulates (TSP). The plaintiffs claimed that the 
EP A violated section 553 in promulgating this rule. 214 The Third Cir-
cuit upheld the plaintiff's argument, holding that the EPA's section 
107(d) designations were promulgated without following proper sec-
tion 553 rulemaking procedures. In finding that the Administrator 
lacked good cause to bypass normal section 553 procedures, the 
court attempted to "coordinate the commands of the AP A and those 
of the Clean Air Act."215 
The court noted that nowhere during the debate over and enact-
ment of the 1977 Amendments did Congress express any intention 
of relieving the EPA from the ordinary rulemaking procedures of 
the APA in formulating section 107(d) designations. 216 The court ad-
mitted that the lack of express congressional intent to bypass the 
normal section 553 procedures did not settle the issue in and of 
itself.217 Nevertheless, it went on to reject the EPA's contention that 
211. The EPA in its statement involving the good cause exceptions (attached to the March 
3, 1978 regulations) mentioned these factors. See text at note 138 supra. 
212. 597 F.2d 377 (3d Cir. 1979). 
213. The four areas are: The City of Sharon; the City of Farrell; the Allentown-Bethlehem-
Easton Air Basin; and the Harrisburg Air Basin. 
214. 597 F.2d 377, 378-79 (3d Cir. 1979). 
215. [d. at 380. 
216. [d. 
217. [d. 
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the strictness of the statutory schedule precluded prior notice and 
comment.218 
The court did offer an alternative scenario which it would have 
found acceptable. This scenario was presented by the Third Circuit 
as follows. The Administrator received the Pennsylvania designa-
tions on December 5, 1977. Since the EPA planned to modify these 
designations only when clearly incorrect, the Administrator should 
have been able to publish the Pennsylvania designations as proposed 
rules within ten days after receiving them. This would have given the 
states, at least, a description of the subjects and issues involved in ac-
cordance with section 553(bX3). Then, the comment period could 
have run until January 15, 1978, at which time the EPA could have 
taken about ninety days to review the comments (the Administrator 
actually took about 120 days to review the comments received during 
the sixty day post-promulgation period). Thus, the final rule would 
have been issued on or about April 15th rather than the March 3rd 
date. This would have given the states only one month less to draft 
their SIP's by the statutorily required January 1, 1979, date. The 
court determined that this would have been ample time in light of the 
fact that: 1) the states would have known with certainty the contents 
of the final rule on that date; and 2) the states could have begun draft-
ing their SIP's as early as December 5,1978, since their designation 
lists would be quite similar to the final designation.219 
It is interesting to note that despite the voluminous case law on the 
good cause exceptions, the Third Circuit made its finding on this 
issue without referring to many other cases. In fact, the only case 
cited in its discussion of the section 553 exceptions was American 
Iron & Steel Institute v. EPA.220 This case was cited merely for the 
proposition that the good cause exceptions are to be narrowly con-
strued.221 
The second case to consider the validity of the section 107(d) 
designations was U.S. Steel Corp. v. EPA,222 a Fifth Circuit case. 
That case also held that the EPA was incorrect in using the good 
cause exceptions to bypass normal rulemaking procedures. In U.S. 
Steel a steel company challenged the EPA's designation of various 
218. Id. 
219. Id. 
220. 568 F.2d 284 (3d Cir. 1977). 
221. Sharon Steel Corp. v. EPA, 597 F.2d 377,379·80 (3d Cir. 1979). 
222. 595 F.2d 207 (5th Cir. 1979). 
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areas of Alabama as nonattainment for TSP. 223 As in Sharon Steel, 
the court interpreted the EPA's statement of good cause to be based 
principally on the strict statutory timetable. However, citing 
American Iron & Steel Institute v. EPA224 and Shell Oil V. FEA,225 
the circuit court held that a mere statutory deadline was not enough 
in itself to constitute good cause.226 It concluded that, while a 
deadline is a factor to be considered, the agency must still show "the 
impracticability of affording notice and comment."227 The court held 
that the EPA was unable to meet this burden. Using basically the 
same rationale as the Third Circuit, it noted that the EPA gave no 
reason why it could not have published the Alabama list upon receipt 
and accept comments while reviewing it, thereby giving the peti-
tioners an opportunity to influence the agency's action prior to 
promulgation.228 Further, the circuit stressed that the EPA itself did 
not regard the statutory deadline as sacrosanct, since its list was 
published one month late.229 
In U.S. Steel the court also addressed and rejected the Ad-
ministrator's argument that the EPA had good cause in that it had to 
provide immediate guidance to the states in formulating their SIP 
revisions.23o The court noted, as did the Third Circuit,231 that the 
states could have started revising their SIP's as soon as they submit-
ted them to the EPA since the EPA's role was limited to just 
modifications.232 When the EPA made their modifications, the states 
could then have revised their plans to accommodate these modifica-
tions. 
In the next case involving the validity of the section l07( d) designa-
tions, U.S. Steel Corp. v. EPA,233 the Seventh Circuit refused to 
follow the Third and Fifth Circuits and instead found that the EPA 
did indeed have good cause to bypass section 553 procedures. This 
223. ld. at 210. 
224. 568 F.2d 284 (3d Cir. 1977). 
225. 527 F.2d 1243 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1975). See text at notes 193-98 supra. 
226. 595 F.2d 207, 213 (5th Cir. 1979). 
227. ld. In concluding, the Fifth Circuit cited American Iron & Steel lnst., holding that the 
Agency had not made a strong enough showing to invoke these narrowly construed excep-
tions. However, the court did recognize the fact that courts have used the exception "where 
delay would do real harm," citing the DeRieu:c, Nader, and Reeves cases. ld. at 214. 
228. ld. at 213. 
229. ld. It is somewhat ironic that the court raised this point since the state was seventeen 
days late in submitting its list to the EPA here. 
230. ld. at 214; see text at note 138 supra. 
231. Sharon Steel Corp. v. EPA, 597 F.2d 377,380 (3d Cir. 1979). 
232. 595 F.2d 207, 214 (5th Cir. 1979). 
233. 605 F.2d 283 (7th Cir. 1979). 
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case, which involved contested nonattainment areas in northern In-
diana, was markedly different in its approach and analysis than the 
two earlier cases. First, unlike the Third and Fifth Circuits, the court 
had rejected the idea that the two good cause exceptions have 
roughly the same meaning, holding the (dX3) exception to be broader 
since it has no qualifying language.234 The court noted that the 
legislative history of the (dX3) exception contained a statement that 
the exception would apply in conditions of "demonstrable urgency," 
interpreting this to be a broader exception than the (b XB) exception. 
However, despite this unique interpretation, the court determined 
that good cause could be found under both exceptions. 
The court began its discussion of the validity of the section 107(d) 
designations with the narrower (bXB) exception.235 In analyzing the 
(b XB) exception, the court found that normal section 553 procedures 
would have been impracticable in this case since the EPA was faced 
with a situation "in which the due and required execution of the 
agency function would be prevented by its undertaking public 
rulemaking proceedings."236 The court accepted the EPA's argu-
ment that a tight statutory schedule may justify good cause, citing 
the Clay Broadcasting Corp. v. U.S. and Energy Reserves Group v. 
FEA cases as support for this position.237 Taking a broader view of 
the situation than the Third and Fifth Circuits, the court concluded 
that the deadlines here "were a response to the failure of the states 
to meet prior attainment deadlines and represent congressional con-
cern over the seriously adverse health consequences of continued 
nonattainment."238 In fact, in a footnote,239 the court noted that the 
legislative history of the 1977 Amendments included a passage 
whereby Congress expressed its strong concern over the fact that 
the various major steel companies had no plants in compliance as of 
the time of the 1975 congressional testimony. 240 In light of this back-
234. [d. at 286, 289-90. 
235. [d. at 286-87. 
236. [d. at 287 (quoting S. REP. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in LEGIS. HISTORY 
OF APA 1944-46, supra note 94, at 200,258). 
237. 605 F.2d 283,287 (7th Cir. 1979). 
238. [d. (footnote omitted). 
239. [d. at 287 n.5. 
240. H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 210-11, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CONGo & An. 
NEWS 1289. 
The committee is also mindful of the fact that several categories of major polluters 
have not complied with emission limits in nonattainment areas. The 1975 subcommit-
tee hearings reflect this disturbingly high incidence of noncompliance. In particular, 
the following testimony is of great concern: 
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ground the court determined that the "EPA was properly concerned 
that these explicit deadlines be met."241 It expressed hesitance in 
allowing the petitioner to again delay compliance through this 
challenge, noting that it would throw the deadline scheme into disar-
ray.242 The court distinguished American Iron & Steel Institute v. 
EPA and Consumers Union oj U.S., Inc. v. Sawhill, stating that the 
agencies had much longer periods of time to promulgate the con-
tested rules in those cases than in the instant case.243 
The Seventh Circuit directly rejected the alternative approach 
recommended by both the Third and Fifth Circuits. The court 
reasoned that the EPA needed time to go over the designations 
when first received from the states, since some had to be rejected 
prior to pUblication. Then, adding one month for comment and four 
months to review these comments (the amount of time it actually 
took the EPA), "compliance with notice and comment procedures 
would have delayed promulgation by five months or more, leaving 
the states with less than six months to formulate implementation 
plans."244 The court concluded that "given the legislative require-
ment of expeditious promulgation, the need for the states to begin 
promptly their own planning process, and the continuing adverse im-
pact on health that any further delays would entail, . . . the Ad-
ministrator had 'good cause' to exempt these designations from sec-
tion 553."245 The court also held that the broader (dX3) exception ap-
plied since, as any delay in the EPA's designations would ultimately 
result in health problems due to delayed nonattainment, 
"demonstrable urgency" existed in this case.246 
[d. 
MR. ROGERS. Let's see, we have had the law five years now. Could you tell me, 
company by company, how many of your plants are in compliance presently and 
how many are not? 
MR. ARMOUR (Interlake, Inc.). I think we have to define in compliance with what. 
MR. ROGERS. The Clean Air Act? 
MR. ARMOUR. We do not have any in compliance. 
MR. ANDERSON (Bethlehem Steel Corp.). None. 
MR. JAICKS (Inland Steel Co.). None. 
MR. MALLICK (U.S. Steel Co.). None. 
MR. TUCKER (National Steel Corp.). We have no plants in compliance. 
MR. JAICKS. It sounds terrible. But these are hard value money expenditures. 
MR. TUCKER. There are some good reasons for this. 
MR. ROGERS. It is shocking to me. I didn't realize we had no plants in the steel in-
dustry in compliance. 
241. 605 F.2d 283,288 (7th Cir. 1979). 
242. [d. at 288-89 & n.l1. 
243. [d. at 288 n.8. 
244. [d. at 288. 
245. [d. at 288-89 (footnotes omitted). 
246. [d. at 290. 
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Not long after the decision of the Seventh Circuit, the Sixth Circuit 
case of Republic Steel Corp. v. Costle247 was decided. This case in-
volved an attack by eight major corporations248 on designations by 
the EP A of various parts of Ohio as nonattainment for sulfur dioxide 
(S02)' The petitioners agreed that these designations were pro-
mulgated without following proper section 553 procedures. In 
Republic Steel the court, like the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, 
found good cause to exist for bypassing normal section 553 pro-
cedures. The Sixth Circuit devoted much of its opinion to a discus-
sion of the long history of recalcitrance by industry.249 It noted how 
industries in Ohio have continually resisted the EPA's attempts to 
attain NP AAQS for S02 by filing numerous lawsuits.260 Further, the 
court dealt extensively with the massive health problems posed by 
the failure to attain acceptable levels of S02 and noted that the 
NAAQS's had been set with little or no margin of safety.261 
The court put forth five separate reasons for its holding that the 
(bXB) exception was applicable. First, the court noted that the 
January 1,1979, mandatory attainment date (for SIP's) could not be 
achieved if notice and comment procedures were followed, thereby 
making them impracticable. Second, the Sixth Circuit cited the long 
history of industry non-cooperation in dealing with the S02 problem 
in Ohio (Le., numerous protests and litigation). Third, the court 
stated that the Administrator could not rely on Ohio EPA's designa-
tions since experience showed that Ohio EPA represented more 
often the interests of industry rather than the general public. 
Fourth, the circuit determined that it would be "contrary to the 
public interest to ignore the statutory schedule,"262 since the lack of 
control of S02 emissions outweighs any economic arguments 
presented. Finally, the court concluded that the EPA had in fact 
given consideration to the post-promulgation comments and made 
many changes in the designations.263 
In concluding, the court expressly rejected the approach of the 
Third and Fifth Circuits. It stated: 
Both the Third and Fifth Circuit opinions appear to us to ignore 
the sense of urgency which characterized the Congressional 
247. 621 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1980). 
248. The corporations were: Republic Steel Corp., General Motors Corp., U.S. Steel Corp., 
Ohio Edison Co., B.F. Goodrich Co., Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Shell Oil Co., and Dayton 
Power and Light Co. 
249. 621 F.2d 797,799-80 (6th Cir. 1980). 
250. [d. 
251. [d. at 800-02. 
252. [d. at 804. 
253. [d. at 803-04. 
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debate preceding the passage of the Clean Air Act Amendments 
of 1977. Additionally, we would wish to be somewhat more sen-
sitive to the "public interest" in achievement of national air 
quality standards. If the circumstances of this case do not justify 
employment of the good cause exception, we will be hard put to 
find any justification for its use. Past experience has taught this 
court that remand means an additional two-year delay in achiev-
ing national air quality standards in Ohio.264 
The final opinion to consider the validity of the section 107(d) 
designations was the D.C. Circuit case of New Jersey v. EPA.266 In 
this case many states, principally from the northeast,266 protested 
various EPA designations of AQCR's as nonattainment for 
photochemical oxidant pollution (oxidants).267 Despite the fact that 
the two most recent cases on the subject had upheld the EPA's pro-
mulgation of the section 107(d) designations, the D.C. Circuit failed 
to find good cause for the EPA's action. 
The D.C. Circuit discussed many reasons why it found the EPA's 
use of the good cause exceptions to be inappropriate. The court 
devoted a large portion of its opinion to a review of the Third, Fifth, 
Sixth, and Seventh Circuit cases. The D.C. Circuit, however, made 
clear that it found the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit persuasive.268 In 
reaching its decision, the court first noted the importance of the sec-
tion 553 rulemaking procedure, and emphasized that the exceptions 
to it must be narrowly construed.269 In emphasizing the importance 
of following normal AP A procedures in this situation, the D.C. Cir-
cuit next opined that "the AP A may be deployed to insure that the 
Administrator fulfills his obligations under the Clean Air Act"260 
since public input can be important in spotting possible errors made 
by the EPA or the states.261 
The third, and most important, reason for its decision was the 
court's view that "under the facts of this case, the Administrator 
could have reconciled the commands of the two acts by publishing 
the designations submitted to him by the states as proposed 
254. [d. at 804. 
255. 626 F.2d 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
256. Besides New Jersey, the other states which were petitioners in this case were Maine, 
Connecticut, Massachusetts, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont, as well as the District of 
Columbia and the City of New York. 
257. 626 F.2d 1038, 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
258. [d. at 1042. 
259. [d. at 1045-46. 
260. [d. at 1046. 
261. [d. at 1046-47. 
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rules."262 Under this view, also adopted by the Third and Fifth Cir-
cuits, the Administrator would have followed normal section 553 
procedures with the section 107(d) designations being promulgated 
as a final rule by April 15, two months after the original deadline. 
The opinion reasoned that neither the Sixth nor Seventh Circuits 
showed how this reconciliation might be unsatisfactory. The court 
concluded that, if these section 553 exceptions are truly to be narrow-
ly construed, then they cannot be invoked where such a reconcilia-
tion is possible.263 The court also recognized that both the Sixth and 
Seventh Circuit opinions hinged in part on evidence of past 
recalcitrance by certain states and industries. However, the D.C. 
Circuit failed to decide what weight this evidence should be given 
since no such evidence was presented in this case.264 
The D.C. Circuit also expressly criticized the approach taken by 
the Sixth and Seventh Circuits. Specifically, it attempted to discredit 
the Seventh Circuit's use of the Clay265 and Energy Reserves266 
cases, stating that they were not applicable to the situation at 
hand.267 Further, the court, while admitting reversal would delay im-
plementation of the CAA, stated that such reversal would "not 
noticeably interfere with, and may actually promote, the ends of the 
Clean Air Act."268 Finally, the court rejected the Seventh Circuit's 
262. Id. at 1047. 
263. Id. 
264. Id. 
265. Clay Broadcasting Corp. v. United States, 464 F.2d 1313 (5th Cir. 1972), rev'd on other 
grounds sub nom., National Cable Television Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 415 U.S. 336 (1974). 
266. Energy Reserves Group v. FEA, 447 F. Supp. 1135 (D. Kan. 1978). 
267. The D.C. Circuit, while not contending "that a statutory schedule can never preclude 
notice-and-comment rule making" (626 F.2d 1038,1047 (D.C. Cir. 1980», stated that Clay and 
Energy Reserves did not bear the precedental weight placed on them. The court concluded that 
Clay was not applicable since it only involved the (d)(3) good cause exception. However, this 
analysis by the D.C. Circuit overlooked the fact that the § 107(d) designations in the present 
case involved the (d)(3) exception as well as the (b)(B) exception. The court distinguished 
Energy Reserves on the basis that "the time statutorily allotted for the promulgation of regula-
tions was so extraordinarily short-fifteen days-that notice and comment were 'unavoidably 
prevented, ... in an almost physical sense." Id. at 1047. The court stated that Energy Re-
serves was also based on "the necessity to quickly decontrol stripper lease prices once Con-
gress' intent to do so was statutorily mandated in order that oil not be held off the market in 
anticipation of such price increase." Id. (quoting Energy Reserves Group v. FEA, 447 F. Supp. 
1135, 1150 (D. Kan. 1978». 
268. 626 F.2d 1038, 1048 (D.C. Cir. 1980). The court stated that: 
An agency's functions will be impaired any time it is reversed on procedural grounds, 
and such occasional impairments are the price we pay to preserve the integrity of the 
AP A. Of course, cases under the "tight schedule" version of good cause are sure to be 
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approach to the (dX3) exception holding that it was wholly irrelevant 
in this case.269 
C. Analysis of the Split Among the Circuits on the Good Cause 
Issue and Conclusion in this Area 
The three-to-two split among the circuits over the good cause issue 
is representative of a sharp difference of opinion among the courts 
as to how the section 553 exceptions should be analyzed and defined. 
Analysis of these cases, and the earlier good cause cases upon which 
they partly rest, is often hampered by continuous confusion by the 
courts over the distinction between the (b XB) and (dX3) exceptions, 
as well as by differing opinions over the scope of these exceptions. 
However, despite the lack of precision in this area, certain basic dif-
ferences in approach are quite clear upon analysis of the five circuit 
court opinions. 
One major difference in the analysis of the courts is that the Third, 
Fifth, and D.C. Circuits found the 107(d) deadline and the normal 
section 553 rulemaking procedures reconcilable while the Sixth and 
Seventh Circuits did not. As the D.C. Circuit stated most succinctly: 
The Sixth and Seventh Circuits assume that the goals of the 
Clean Air Act and the Administrative Procedure Act irrecon-
cilably conflict, and no doubt the facts and background of U.S. 
Steel and Sharon Steel suggest that the rules of the latter Act 
may be employed to thwart the goals of the former. But this 
assumption fundamentally misconceives the purpose and shrugs 
off the wisdom of the AP A. Both the case at bar and our explica-
tion of the AP A show that the AP A may be deployed to insure 
that the Administrator fulfills his obligations under the Clean 
Air Act.270 
In order to achieve a reconciliation between the AP A and the 1977 
Amendments, the Third, Fifth, and D.C. Circuits recommended a 
modification of the 1977 CAA Amendments' statutory schedule that 
was mandated by Congress. The courts determined that the pro-
cedures outlined in section 553 are so important to proper ad-
particularly troublesome in this respect, since if an agency's allegations as to the need 
for expedition are remotely true, the lapse of time necessary to secure judicial review 
will assure that a court cannot easily reverse the agency. But a court serves neither 
the law nor, ultimately, the parties before it by succumbing, without a cautious exam-
ination of a case's facts, to whatever jait accompli an agency may choose to present. 
269. [d. Apparently, the court believed that the (dX3) exception was not at issue in this case. 
However, this overlooks the fact that the contested § 107(d) designations were made im-
mediately effective thereby raising the (dX3) issue. See note 265 supra. 
270. 626 F.2d 1038, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
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ministrative rule making that modifications in the 1977 Amend-
ments' statutory schedule were justified. These three circuits of-
fered an alternative scenario stating that the Administrator should 
have first published the state's designations immediately as proposed 
rules, then allowed thirty days for public comments, and finally 
published the designations as a final rule by April 15, 1978. Thus, in 
order to achieve this "reconciliation," the three courts realized that 
the statutory deadline for the section 107(d) designations could not 
be met if normal rule making procedures were followed. This raises 
the question whether Congress, by setting such a strict statutory 
timetable, was implicitly requiring that, if necessary, normal section 
553 procedures be bypassed and the good cause exceptions used in 
the promulgation of the nonattainment designations.271 If it is 
assumed, as it rightfully should be, that Congress was aware of the 
requirements of the APA when drafting section 107(d), then the 
answer to this question must be yes. These exceptions provide the 
perfect vehicle for reconciling the CAA and AP A in this situation, 
since they allow the EPA to meet Congress' mandated deadline 
without violating any provisions of the AP A. This argument is fur-
ther supported by the sense of urgency which existed in Congress 
when setting these deadlines, because of the long history of failure to 
attain healthy air in the U.S.272 
This interpretation puts the approach of the Third, Fifth, and D.C. 
Circuits on shaky ground. Their interpretation is questionable since 
it essentially rewrites the 1977 Amendments despite the fact that 
Congress appeared to have implicitly rejected the need for normal 
section 553 procedures. The Third Circuit in the Sharon Steel case 
anticipated this argument and attempted to refute it. The court 
stated that: 
Congress gave no explicit indication that it intended to override 
the procedural safeguards of the AP A . . . . Even at the time 
when Congress passed the amendments to the Clean Air Act, 
the circumstances that the Administrator advances as good 
cause should have been apparent. Nonetheless, Congress 
nowhere recorded any express indication that the 1977 Amend-
ments should relieve the Administrator from the ordinary pro-
cedures set forth in the AP A for rulemaking. 273 
271. This point, while not expressly stated, was implied by the Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth and Seventh Circuits when they stated that the February 1978 deadline for the § 107(d) 
designations could not be reconciled with the AP A unless the good cause exceptions were 
utilized. 
272. Both the Sixth and Seventh Circuits mentioned that Congress exhibited a sense of 
urgency when passing the 1977 Amendments. 
273. Sharon Steel Corp. v. EPA, 597 F.2d 377,380 (3d Cir. 1979). 
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The Third Circuit's argument, however, seems to overlook the fact 
that the AP A has exceptions built right into it, thereby eliminating 
the need for any express indications by Congress of an intent to 
bypass normal AP A procedures. 
Although not cited by either the Sixth or Seventh Circuits in their 
opinions, there is some case law under the CAA supporting the idea 
that Congress can, in fact, implicitly authorize the bypass of normal 
section 553 procedures. In both Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA 274 
and Duquesne Light Co. v. EPA,276 suits were brought under the 
1970 CAA claiming that violations of section 553 had occurred. In 
these cases, public notice and comment procedures were followed, as 
required by statute, by state authorities when formulating their 
SIP's but were not followed by the EPA when it reviewed these 
plans and promulgated them as rules. In finding that the EPA had 
good cause under the (b)(B) exception to promulgate these rules, the 
Fourth Circuit in Appalachian Power went into a lengthy discussion 
of why a hearing before the EPA was not warranted: 
It [a federal hearing] would seem particularly unwarranted, 
too, in a situation, where Congress had determined that expedi-
tion was demanded by urgent considerations of health and the 
general welfare. That Congress intended that such a hearing 
before the Administrator on the state plan was to be avoided in 
the interest of expediting action is persuasively suggested by the 
statutory language. Thus, the Amendments in express words en-
join the state authorities to afford, after notice, a hearing to all 
interested parties, but, in providing for the subsequent approval 
by the Administrator, it omitted any prior hearing requirement. 
This omission would seem to have been purposeful, in keeping 
with the Congressional intent to expedite the promulgation of 
state enforcement plans, without encumbering the ad-
ministrative procedures with two hearings on the same plan. 
That this was so, the Administrator found confirmed, since, 
under the provisions of the Amendments, there was "no prac-
tical way that the rulemaking procedures of the Administrative 
Procedure Act [covering hearings preliminary to administrative 
actions] could be followed if the statutory time-table [for the pro-
mulgation and approval of state implementation plans under the 
Amendments] was to be observed." ... In effect, Congress 
made a finding, which the Administrator merely confirmed in 
his order, that, under these circumstances, a hearing at the Ad-
ministrator's level was both "impractical" and "unnecessary." 
That finding met the requirements of Section 553 (b)(3)(B), 5 
U.S.C.A.176 
274. 477 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1973). 
275. 481 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1973). 
276. 477 F.2d 495, 502-03 (4th Cir. 1973). 
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Thus, both the Third277 and Fourth Circuits held that Congress 
assumed that normal section 553 procedures would not be followed 
and the good cause exception would be utilized when there is no prac-
tical way that the AP A can be followed and still meet the express 
deadline. This situation is very analogous to the five circuit cases in-
volving the nonattainment designations, since there was no practical 
way in which the normal rule making procedures of the AP A could 
have been followed by the EPA if the statutory timetable set out in 
section 107(d) was to be met. Also, in Appalachian Power, the omis-
sion of express words calling for notice and comment procedures in 
section 107(d) would seem to have been purposeful, in keeping with 
the congressional intent to expedite the attainment of the primary 
standards. 
This discussion of congressional intent ties into another major dif-
ference between the circuits in their good cause analyses, namely, 
how broadly a court should look at the circumstances involved. A 
mere conclusory statement should not, in itself, be enough to justify 
good cause if the section 553 procedures are to have any real mean-
ing. However, it was also not the intention of Congress to overturn 
regulations for merely technical noncompliance especially when 
good cause clearly exists.278 In this regard, cases such as De Rieux279 
and N ader280 suggest that a more comprehensive view of the cir-
cumstances should be undertaken by the court in order to determine 
if good cause does in fact exist. 
The term "more comprehensive view of the circumstances" is used 
here to signify something closely analogous to a totality of the cir-
cumstances test. By taking a comprehensive or broad view of the cir-
cumstances, it is meant that the court will not base its decision solely 
on the plain meaning of an agency's statement of good cause. 
Rather, it signifies that a court should look at the broader totality of 
the circumstances out of which the use of the section 553 exceptions 
arise in making its determination. 
Clearly the Third, Fifth, and, to a lesser extent, D.C. Circuits took 
a fairly narrow view of the circumstances in holding that good cause 
did not exist. They looked at merely the plain meaning of the EPA's 
statement of good cause and not at the broader circumstances out of 
277. In Duquesne Light the Third Circuit expressly followed the rationale of the Fourth Cir-
cuit in Appalachian Power. 
278. DeRieux v. Five Smiths, Inc., 499 F.2d 1321, 1332-33 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1974), 
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 896 (1974). 
279. 499 F.2d 1321 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1974). 
280. Nader v. Sawhill, 387 F. Supp. 1208 (D.D.C. 1974), affd, 514 F.2d 1064 (Temp. Emer. 
Ct. App. 1975). 
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which this statement arose. In their analysis, the three courts which 
failed to find good cause considered only: a) whether the setting of 
the statutory timetable; and b) the state's need for immediate 
guidance justified the use of the good cause exceptions. Unlike the 
Sixth and Seventh Circuits, they did not consider such issues as past 
recalcitrance by industry and public health in analyzing whether the 
Administrator had good cause to bypass section 553 procedures. 
Perhaps the best example of this difference between the courts in 
viewing the totality of the circumstances can be seen by contrasting 
the Fifth and Seventh Circuit court opinions. In the Fifth Circuit opin-
ion, the court stated that the good cause exceptions should be utilized 
only "when delay would do real harm."281 In backing up this prop-
osition, the court cited the Reeves case,282 stating that the regulation 
in this case, designed to allow nonregular customers equal ac-
cess to gasoline during the 1973 shortage and minimize the violence 
related to this problem (fistfights, etc.), met the real harm standard. 
The Fifth Circuit distinguished Reeves from the case at hand, 
positing that a delay in meeting the section 107(d) statutory deadline 
by one or two months does not constitute the same kind of real harm. 
The Seventh Circuit opinion sharply disagreed with the Fifth Cir-
cuit's opinion and in particular its use of the Reeves case. The 
Seventh Circuit took a much broader view of the circumstances, 
stating that delay in meeting these statutory deadlines would 
ultimately mean more health problems due to delayed attainment of 
NPAAQS. The court, in criticizing the Fifth Circuit's use of Reeves, 
stated, "[w]e are at a loss to understand how gas shortages and 
fistfights constitute 'real harm' whereas mortality and illness 
resulting from continued high levels of air pollution do not."283 Thus, 
by taking a broader view of the statement of good cause, the Seventh 
Circuit came to an opinion at direct odds with the Fifth Circuit's 
view. 
To a large extent, the narrow view taken by the Third, Fifth, and 
D.C. Circuits was caused by the EPA itself. In its statement of good 
cause, the EPA mentioned only the states' need for immediate 
guidance and the tight schedule imposed by Congress as reason for 
invoking the exceptions. Nowhere in its statement did the EPA men-
tion the important health factors related to failure to meet the 
NP AAQS by the statutory deadline, nor did it mention the long 
281. u.s. Steel Corp. v. EPA, 595 F.2d 207,214 (5th Cir. 1979) (footnote omitted). 
282. Reeves v. Simon, 504 F.2d 455 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 
991 (1975). 
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history of delay in this area. Thus, the EPA's statement was a con-
clusory statement which did not reveal the underlying reasons why 
good cause was justified. The EPA may have greatly hurt its own 
case by not providing more detailed reasoning in its statement. 
One final area in which the five circuit court cases involving the 
section 107(d) designations took differing approaches is in their 
analysis of the express deadline strand of good cause cases. While 
most of these courts dealt with this issue quite summarily, it is an im-
portant area in which a sharp split can be discerned. As seen earlier 
in the section on express deadline cases, the courts have denied good 
cause only in cases where an agency has had a substantial period of 
time to meet the deadline. In the American Iron and Steel284 and 
Shell Oil285 cases, for example, the agencies had two and one-half 
years and six months respectively to prepare for the deadlines. Also 
in the Consumers Union286 case, the agency had over a year to pass 
the contested regulations before the final deadline. On the other 
hand, the two cases mentioned earlier which upheld the EPA's good 
cause claim on the basis of a statutory deadline, Clay Broadcast-
ing287 and Energy Reserves,288 both involved very short time 
periods-about one month in Clay Broadcasting and only fifteen 
days in Energy Reserves. Thus, the five principle cases discussed in 
this article deal with a time period, ninety days, which falls in be-
tween the time involved in the earlier express deadline cases. 
The Fifth and D.C. Circuit COurtS289 rejected the idea that the ex-
istence of a deadline for agency action, whether set by statute or 
court order, constitutes good cause for a section 553(b XB) exception. 
The Fifth Circuit, citing American Iron and Steel and Shell Oil as 
support, stated that a "deadline is a factor to be considered, but the 
agency must still show the impracticability of affording notice and 
comment."290 The court held that the EPA did not meet this showing 
of impracticability in this case. However, neither the Fifth Circuit 
nor the D.C. Circuit made serious mention of the immediacy element 
present in this strand of good cause cases. While the D.C. Circuit at-
283. u.s. Steel Corp. v. EPA, 605 F.2d 283,289 n.10 (7th Cir. 1979). 
284. American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 568 F.2d 284 (3d Cir. 1977). 
285. Shell Oil Co. v. FEA, 527 F.2d 1243 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1975). 
286. Consumers Union of United States v. Sawhill, 393 F. Supp. 639 (D.D.C. 1975). 
287. Clay Broadcasting Corp. v. United States, 464 F.2d 1313 (5th Cir. 1972), rev'd on other 
grounds sub nom., Nat'l Cable Television Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 415 U.S. 336 (1974). 
288. Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. FEA, 447 F. Supp. 1135 (D. Kan. 1978). 
289. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit did not directly address this issue and did 
not discuss any of the cases in the express deadline strand of good cause cases. 
290. U.S. Steel Corp. v. EPA, 595 F.2d 207,213 (5th Cir. 1979). 
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tempted to distinguish Energy Reserves on the basis that it involved 
an "extraordinarily short" time period, neither that Circuit nor the 
Fifth Circuit mentioned the very short time period involved in pro-
mulgating the section l07(d) designations. These courts did not deal 
with the fact that, just as in Clay Broadcasting and Energy Reserves, 
the ninety-day express deadline could only be made if the good cause 
exceptions were utilized. 
On the other hand, the Sixth and particularly the Seventh Circuits 
recognized the strong element of immediacy present in these cases. 
Both of these courts recognized that, as in Clay Broadcasting and 
Energy Reserves, use of the good cause exceptions was necessary in 
order to meet the express deadline mandated by Congress. The 
Seventh Circuit expressly mentioned291 that the American Iron & 
Steel and Consumers Union cases involved much longer time periods 
than in the instant case. Thus, these courts recognized, quite correct-
ly, that the situation at hand was much more analogous to Clay 
Broadcasting and Energy Reserves than to the other express 
deadline cases. They concluded that the good cause exceptions were 
designed to be used in such a situation so that the congressionally 
mandated deadline could be upheld. 
This discussion has, to now, centered on the analysis of the five cir-
cuit courts on the major issue of good cause to bypass normal section 
553 rulemaking procedures. However, primarily in those three 
courts in which good cause was not found, there remained various 
secondary issues for the courts to deal with. This article will now ad-
dress the courts' treatment of these secondary issues. 
IV. THE CASES-SECONDARY ISSUES 
After the five Circuit Courts of Appeal made their initial deter-
mination on whether good cause existed to invoke a section 553 ex-
ception, they were still faced with the task of resolving various 
secondary issues. First, the three circuits which found a section 553 
violation had to examine whether the doctrine of harmless error 
allowed the section l07(d) designations to stand, regardless of the 
AP A violation. These three courts also had to fashion equitable relief 
for the aggrieved parties, trying to reconcile the somewhat conflict-
ing goals of the AP A and the CAA. Finally, despite holding good 
cause to exist for bypassing normal section 553 procedures, the 
Seventh Circuit dealt with the issue of what constitutes the proper 
291. U.S. Steel Corp. v. EPA, 605 F.2d 283,288 n.8 (7th Cir. 1979). 
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scope of judicial review of section 107(d) designations. These second-
ary issues will be discussed in the balance of this article. In addition, 
their impact on the implementation of the 1977 Amendments will be 
analyzed. 
A. Harmless Error 
1. Background 
The doctrine of harmless error, as applied to administrative cases, 
is closely tied in with the concept of scope of judicial review. Since 
the harmless error doctrine presents a standard upon which a 
reviewing court may base its reversal of a lower court opinion, the 
doctrine serves as a standard which both defines and limits the scope 
of review. In light of this close relationship, it is not surprising that 
the APA's harmless error provision is found within APA section 
706292 entitled "Scope of Review." For purposes of this article, the 
relevant subparts of this section state: 
The reviewing court shall-
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions 
found to be-
(D) without observance of procedures required by law. 
In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall review the whole 
record or those parts of it cited by a party, and due account shall be taken 
of the rule of prejudicial error. 
292. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976) (emphasis added). This section was originally known as § 10(e) of 
the AP A. The entire section reads: 
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide 
all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and deter· 
mine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action. The reviewing court 
shall-
(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and 
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be-
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance 
with law; 
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; 
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory 
right; 
(D) without observance of procedure required by law; 
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 556 and 557 of 
this title [5 U.S.C. §§ 556 and 557] or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency 
hearing provided by statute; or 
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de novo 
by the reviewing court. 
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Thus, the AP A grants reviewing courts the power to overturn an 
agency action promulgated without following proper section 553 
procedures only when some prejudice can be shown by the aggrieved 
party.293 
The case law on the harmless error doctrine prior to these five Cir-
cuit cases is relatively uniform in its application of the doctrine to 
review of actions. Most courts hold that the courts and agencies 
together constitute a partnership for the purpose of effectuating the 
congressional will and furthering the public interest.294 The courts 
have therefore concluded that "an error cannot be dismissed as 
'harmless' without taking into account the limited ability of a court 
to assume as a judicial function, the distinctive discretion assigned to 
the agency."295 
Because of the somewhat limited role of the courts in reviewing 
agency actions, judges usually will not strike down such actions for 
merely technical violations.296 This limited role has clearly been ap-
plied by the courts to violations of section 706(2XD). While it is clear 
that the harmless error doctrine cannot be used so broadly as to 
undermine the procedures which the APA seeks to promote,297 most 
courts agree that "procedural irregularities are not per se preju-
dicial."298 Although there is some disagreement as to how strict a 
standard should be applied, the courts299 generally follow a standard 
roughly equivalent to that in the federal harmless error statute300 
which states: "On the hearing of any appeal or writ of certiorari in 
any case, the court shall give judgment after an examination of the 
record without regard to errors or defects which do not affect the 
substantial rights of the parties." Thus, where procedural violations 
are present, courts will generally not overrule regulation unless ac-
tual prejudice is shown. In the case of section 706(2XD) violations, 
In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall review the whole record or those 
parts of it cited by a party, and due account shall be taken ofthe rule of prejudicial error. 
293. See, e.g., NLRB v. Seine & Line Fisherman's Union of San Pedro, 374 F.2d 974,981 
(9th Cir.), eert. denied, 389 U.S. 913 (1967). 
294. Ala. Ass'n. of Ins. Agents v. Bd. of Gov. of Fed. Reserve Syst., 533 F.2d 224, 236-37 
(5th Cir. 1976); Greater Boston Tel. Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851-52 (D.C. Cir. 1970); 
Braniff Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 379 F.2d 453, 465-66 (D.C. Cir. 1967). 
295. Braniff Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 379 F.2d 453, 465-66 (D.C. Cir. 1967); see SEC v. 
Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947). 
296. Ala. Ass'n. of Ins. Agents v. Bd. of Gov. of Fed. Reserve Syst., 553 F.2d 224, 236 (5th 
Cir. 1976). 
297. See Cheung v. INS, 418 F.2d 460, 464 (D.C. Cir. 1969). 
298. NLRB v. Seine & Line Fisherman's Union of San Pedro, 374 F.2d 974,981 (9th Cir.), 
eert. denied, 389 U.S. 913 (1967). 
299. E.g., Braniff Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 379 F.2d 453, 465 (D.C. Cir. 1967). 
300. 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1976). 
1981] NOTICE AND COMMENT REQUIREMENTS 601 
the standard most generally followed is that stated in the Ninth Cir-
cuit case of NLRB v. Seine & Line Fisherman's Union of San 
Pedro:301 "Procedural irregularities are not per se prejudicial; each 
case must be determined on its individual facts . . . . Moreover, 
'the burden of showing that prejudice has resulted' is on the party 
claiming injury from the erroneous rulings. "302 
In this regard, prejudice is generally held to mean that the party 
claiming injury must show that the contested procedural violations 
have been the cause of the injury. Thus, in NLRB v. Health Tec 
Division/San Francisco,303 an error had occurred at a representa-
tion hearing when the hearing officer failed to make an independent 
evaluation of privilege before issuing his report to the NLRB. The 
reviewing court refused to reverse since the party could not establish 
that this determination had resulted in prejudice to him. Also in 
Chrysler Corp. v. FTC,304 the court refused to reverse an FTC order 
where evidence was allowed to be admitted subsequent to argument 
before the Commission, since this evidence was not believed to be 
prejudicial to the petitioner. However, where actions by the agency 
clearly change the outcome, then the error is prejudicial and war-
rants reversal. Thus, in Braniff v. C.A.B., 305 the court reversed a 
decision by the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) granting a Dallas-to-
Miami run to Eastern Airlines, where the CAB had based its decision 
on several factual errors which clearly had a material effect on the 
outcome. 
Closely related to the harmless error issue is the question whether 
alternative procedures can be used, thus making an earlier pro-
cedural error harmless. Specifically, in the five principle cases 
discussed in this article, the question arose whether the EPA's grant-
ing of post-promulgation (i.e., post hoc) notice and comment was an 
adequate alternative to normal section 553 procedure and thus made 
the procedural violations harmless. In this regard, the case law is vir-
tually unanimous in holding that such alternatives are not 
adequate. 306 
The underlying rationale of the cases rejecting post-promulgation 
301. 374 F.2d 974 (9th Cir.), em. denied, 389 U.S. 913 (1967). 
302. [d. at 981 (citations omitted). 
303. 566 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir.), eert. denied, 439 U.S. 832 (1978). 
304. 561 F.2d 357 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
305. 379 F.2d 453 (D.C. Cir. 1967). 
306. Kelly v. Dept. of Interior, 339 F. Supp. 1095, 1101-07 (E.D. Cal. 1972) (three judge 
court); City of N.Y. v. Diamond, 379 F. Supp. 503, 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Maryland v. EPA, 
F.2d 215,222 (4th Cir. 1975), vacated on other grounds Bub. nom., EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99 
(1977); Wagner Elec. Corp. v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1013, 1020 (3d Cir. 1972). 
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comments is that such comment periods are much less effective than 
the pre-promulgation comments required by the AP A. As the Fourth 
Circuit stated in Maryland v. EPA,307 "[t]he reception of comments 
after all the crucial decisions have been made is not the same as per-
mitting active and well prepared criticism to become a part of the 
decision making process."308 The courts generally agree that, in 
light of the psychoiogical309 and bureaucratic pressures present, 
such post hoc comments are not nearly as effective as pre-promulga-
tion comments, and therefore are not a suitable alternative which 
make harmless a violation of section 553 procedures. 
2. The Five Circuit Court Cases 
The three circuit courts which failed to find good cause for using 
the (b )(B) or (d)(3) exceptions all examined whether or not the con-
tested section 107(d) designations should be allowed to stand under 
the doctrine of harmless error. The EPA argued that its nonattain-
ment designations should be upheld, notwithstanding a section 553 
violation, under this doctrine. Basically, the agency made the conten-
tions in this regard that: 1) the sixty-day post-promulgation comment 
period made any procedural violations harmless; and 2) the com-
panies and states suffered no real harm since the contested designa-
tions were only designed to aid the states in developing their SIP's.31o 
In all three circuits, these contentions were rejected. 
The Third Circuit held that the EPA's improper use of the good 
cause exceptions was prejudicial in nature to the petitioners. The 
plaintiffs in this case, Sharon Steel Corp. and Bethlehem Steel Corp., 
claimed that the section 107(d) designations would place great 
burdens on their ability to expand and grow in the contested areas. 
They argued, quite successfully, that, in light of this economic 
burden, the absence of notice and comment procedures was not 
harmless. 
The court determined that the steel companies were, in fact, in-
jured despite the EPA's argument that the challenged designations 
were only designed to give guidance to the states and were not bind-
ing with respect to applications by companies to build new plants or 
modify existing ones. The court noted that, since the implementation 
307. 530 F.2d 215 (4th Cir. 1975). 
308. [d. at 222. 
309. See N.J. v. EPA, 626 F.2d 1038, 1049-50 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
310. EPA contention number two does not apply to the D.C. Circuit case because all the 
petitioners were states and were thus not directly affected by the Offset Ruling's limitations 
on new development. 
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of the Offset Policy,311 companies in nonattainment areas do face 
significant burdens in getting licenses. Thus, the Third Circuit con-
cluded: 
The designations fixed by the Administrator evidently will have 
some weight, even if they will not be dispositive. Moreover, the 
uncertainty about what weight these designations will carry in 
future proceedings may influence the companies current plans 
for construction. The Administrator's failure to abide by the 
AP A, we conclude, was not harmless.312 
The Fifth Circuit took a slightly different route in dismissing the 
argument that the improper bypassing of normal section 553 pro-
cedures was harmless. The court quoted Braniff,313 stating that the 
harmless error doctrine should be used only "when a mistake of the 
administrative body is one that clearly had no bearing on the pro-
cedure used or the substance of decision reached."314 Taking a very 
narrow view of the harmless error doctrine, the court held that, since 
the agency's error plainly affected the procedure used, the court 
could not assume that there was no prejudice to the petitioners.315 
With respect to this issue of harmless error, both the Third and 
Fifth Circuits have strong cases. It is quite clear that the EPA's pro-
cedures, once found to be in violation of section 553, were prejudicial 
in nature to the aggrieved parties. First, these designations were 
clearly one of the factors upon which application for licenses for new 
construction or modification of plants were to be judged. Since these 
licenses were quite difficult to get in nonattainment areas due to the 
Offset Ruling and its off-spring legislation in the 1977 Amend-
ments,316 it is clear that such procedural violations were in fact prej-
udicial. 
However, despite the strength of this argument, the Fifth 
Circuit's discussion of the harmless.error issue is poorly conceived 
and open to criticism. While the court mentioned the prejudicial im-
plications of the Offset Ruling when discussing the "ripeness" 
issue,317 the court failed to mention them in connection with the 
311. See text at note 53 supra. 
312. Sharon Steel Corp. v. EPA, 597 F.2d 377,381 (3d Cir. 1979) (footnotes omitted). 
313. Braniff Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 379 F.2d 453 (D.C. Cir. 1967). 
314. U.S. Steel Corp. v. EPA, 595 F.2d 207,215 (5th Cir. 1979). 
315. [d. 
316. 42 U.S.C. § 7503 (Supp. III 1979). 
317. The Fifth Circuit, unlike the other four circuits, felt that there was a ripeness issue 
present. The court agreed with the EPA's contention that the § 107(d) designations were 
merely a preliminary step in the SIP process and in themselves would perhaps be unripe for 
judicial review. However, the court held that the designations have consequences apart from 
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question of harmless error. Instead, the court used the case of 
Braniff Airways v. G.A.B.318 to show that the harmless error doc-
trine did not apply. However, in an apparent attempt to restrict the 
use of the harmless error doctrine, the court interpreted Braniff as 
having a much more strict test for the use of this doctrine than the 
case actually has. Braniff, in quoting from the Supreme Court case 
of Massachusetts Trustees of Eastern Gas and Fuel Associates v. 
U.S.,319 stated that the principle of limited judicial interference with 
agency discretion32o "does not mechanically compel reversal 'when a 
mistake of the administrative body is one that clearly had no bearing 
on the procedure used or the substance of decision reached.' "321 
Yet, in citing the Braniff case, the Fifth Circuit stated that the 
harmless error doctrine "is to be used only 'when a mistake of the 
administrative body is one that clearly had no bearing on the pro-
cedure used or the substance of decision reached.' "322 Clearly, this 
is a much more restrictive application of the harmless error doctrine 
than actually stated in Braniff. Thus, the Fifth Circuit left itself open 
to criticism by incorrectly using this case in arguing for a strict ap-
plication of the harmless error doctrine. 
With respect to the post-promulgation comment issue, the Third, 
Fifth, and D.C. Circuits were in total agreement. Relying on the 
earlier case law mentioned above,323 all three courts determined that 
post hoc comments was not an adequate substitute for pre-
promulgation comments and thus did not render the error harmless. 
Both the Fifth Circuit and D.C. Circuit, relying largely on Kelly v. 
Department of Interior,324 stated: 
Permitting the submission of views after the effective date is no 
substitute for the right of interested persons to make their views 
known to the agency in time to influence the rule making process 
in a meaningful way .... "We doubt that persons would bother 
to submit their views or that the Secretary would seriously con-
their role in the SIP revision process which constitute a substantial injury to the petitioners, 
thus making the controversy ripe for review. The consequences referred to arise from the Off-
set Ruling's limitations on development of new facilities in nonattainment areas. 
318. 379 F.2d 453 (D.C. Cir. 1967). 
319. 377 U.S. 235, 248 (1964). 
320. See text at notes 295-302 supra. 
321. Braniff Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 379 F.2d 453, 466 (U.S. App. D.C. 1967). 
322. U.S. Steel Corp. v. EPA, 595 F.2d 207, 215 (5th Cir. 1979) (quoting Braniff Airways, 
Inc. v. CAB, 379 F.2d 453, 466 (D.C. Cir. 1967» (emphasis added). 
323. See text at notes 307-09 supra. 
324. 339 F. Supp. 1095 (E.D. Cal. 1972). This case involving regulations issued by the 
Secretary of the Interior dividing and distributing assets of California Indian rancheria, also 
rejected the use of post hoc comments. 
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sider their suggestions after the regulations are a fait 
acc(")1npli.". . . Were we to allow the EP A to prevail on this 
point we would make the provisions of § 553 virtually unen-
forceable. An agency that wished to dispense with pre-
promulgation notice and comment could simply do so, invite 
post-promulgation comment, and republish the regulation 
before a reviewing court could act. 325 
605 
The Third Circuit also adopted this rationale stating, "[a]fter the 
final rule is issued, the petitioner must come hat-in-hand and run the 
risk that the decisionmaker is likely to resist change."326 
The Sixth Circuit also considered the issue whether the post hoc 
comments rendered the section 553 violation harmless and explicitly 
rejected the view taken by the Third, Fifth, and D.C. Circuits. The 
court noted that, after receiving these post-promulgation comments, 
the EPA made thirty-six changes or modifications in its previously 
announced designations.327 It viewed the taking of post hoc com-
ments as a reasonable alternative which enabled the EPA to ex-
pedite the attainment process, especially in light of the long history 
of delays in attaining NPAAQS in Ohio. The court stated: "Under 
these circumstances, we think the Administrator's solution of pro-
mulgating a schedule of nonattainment areas and subsequently 
receiving objections and comment, and thereafter effecting such 
changes as were required, was a reasonable approach consistent 
with the Administrative Procedure Act."328 In defense of its holding 
the court cited the Seventh Circuit case of U.S. Steel v. EPA as well 
as Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. v. EPA 329 and Cincinnati Gas 
& Electric Co. v. EPA.330 
With regard to the post hoc comment issue, the approach of the 
Third, Fifth, and D.C. Circuits is more reasonable than that of the 
325. N.J. v. EPA, 626 F.2d 1038, 1049 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (quoting U.S. Steel v. EPA, 595 
F.2d 207,214-15 (5th Cir. 1979), quoting Kelly v. Dept. of Interior, 339 F. Supp. 1095, 1101 
(E.D. Cal. 1972». 
326. See note 312 supra. 
327. Republic Steel Corp. v. Costle, 621 F.2d 797, 804 (6th Cir. 1980). 
328. [d. 
329. 572 F.2d 1150 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 (1978) (court did not require 
the EPA Administrator to make determination on S02 pollution control plan on record after 
opportunity for an agency hearing absent any Clean Air Act language requiring him to do so. 
Court held legislative-type hearing to be sufficient). 
330. 578 F.2d 660 (6th Cir. 1978) (court upheld the EPA's decision to use highly technical 
formula in monitoring S02 emissions to minimize administrative costs). It is interesting to note 
that these cases and the Seventh Circuit case of U.S. Steel v. EPA do not directly deal with the 
post-promulgation comments issue. 
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Sixth Circuit.331 If good cause is not found, it is extremely unlikely 
that post-promulgation comments will be viewed as an adequate 
alternative. The AP A was designed to give the public a chance to 
comment before rules have been promulgated.332 It is at this point 
that public input has its maximum effect upon the process, since no 
firm decisions have been made. In this regard, post hoc comments 
are clearly less effective, since agencies are much less willing to 
change their position once final decisions have been made. Further-
more, to uphold post hoc comments as a valid alternative, after a 
good cause claim has been rejected, would open the door to extensive 
use of such comment periods by agencies. This would create the 
potential for agency abuse which could largely undermine the goals 
of the AP A. 333 
B. Judicial Review-Section 307(d) 
As indicated earlier,334 the CAA contains its own judicial review 
section, section 307,335 which supplements the judicial review provi-
sions of the AP A. Of particular interest here is section 307( d), 336 
which was added to the CAA by the 1977 Amendments. This subsec-
tion makes thirteen specific actions337 under the CAA very difficult 
to overturn upon judicial review. These thirteen actions are set forth 
in section 307(dX1).338 Section 307(dX9) provides that these actions 
can only be overturned if found to be: 
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in ac-
cordance with law; 
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; 
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short 
of statutory right; or 
(D) without observance of procedure required by law, if (i) such failure to 
observe such procedure is arbitrary or capricious, (ii) the require-
331. Since the Sixth Circuit found that good cause did exist for invoking the exceptions, its 
discussion of the post hoc comments issue is dicta. 
332. See text at note 104 supra. 
333. As both the Fifth and D.C. Circuits pointed out, allowing extensive use of post hoc com-
ments would make the provisions of § 553 virtually unenforceable. An agency which wished to 
bypass normal § 553 procedures could simply take post-promulgation comments and republish 
the rule before a reviewing court could act. This could open the door for an agency which 
wished to undermine the goals of § 553, eliminating any meaningful public participation in 
their rulemaking. 
334. See text at notes 81-89 supra. 
335. 42 U.S.C. § 7607 (Supp. III 1979). 
336. [d. § 7607(d) (Supp. III 1979). 
337. [d. § 7607(dX7) (Supp. III 1979). For the entire text of Clean Air Act § 307(dX1), see 
note 84 supra. 
338. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(dX1) (Supp. III 1979). 
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ment of paragraph (7)(B) [that "[ o]nly an objection to a rule or pro-
cedure which was raised. . . during the period for public comment" 
may be revised during the judicial review] has been met, and (iii) the 
condition of the last sentence of paragraph (8) [that the procedural 
errors "were so serious and related to matters of such central rele-
vance to the rule that there is a substantial likelihood that the rule 
would have been significantly changed if such errors had not been 
made' '] is met. 339 
Of particular interest here is subsection (d)(9)(D), which involves 
judicial review of procedural violations under the CAA. Like the rest 
of section 307( d), subsection (d)(9)(D) mandates a standard of review 
which is much more stringent than that required by AP A section 
706(2)(d).340 The legislative history of section 307(d)341 indicates that 
Congress' intent in passing this subsection was to prevent the EPA's 
actions from "bogging down" over technical arguments by limiting 
"the extent to which the Administrator's decisions on such proce-
dural matters may be reversed during judicial review."342 However, 
the plain language of section 307(d) indicates that it applies only to 
those actions listed in section 307(d)(1) and not to all actions under 
the CAA. 
The Seventh Circuit, in a unique interpretation, was the only cir-
cuit to apply section 307(d)(9)(D) to section 107(d) designations. The 
court, after finding good cause for bypassing normal section 553 pro-
cedures, introduced the section 307( d) argument as an alternative 
basis for its holding. 343 The court quoted the legislative history men-
tioned above,344 stressing the fact that the 1977 Amendments were 
designed to eliminate "litigation over technical and procedural ir-
regularities"345 so that NPAAQS may be achieved as expeditiously 
as practicable.346 The court argued that, despite the fact that section 
107(d) designations are not expressly listed in section 307(d)(1), these 
339. [d. § 7607(d)(9). 
340. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(d) (1976). 
341. H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 322, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONGo & 
AD. NEWS 1077, 1401. 
342. [d. 
343. The court presented the § 307 issue as a separate, alternative basis for its holding. In 
introducing the § 307 issue the court stated "[e]ven if the agency's procedures here were not in 
technical compliance with § 553 of the AP A, we would still not be able to reverse the Ad-
ministrator's action in this case." U.S. Steel Corp. v. EPA, 605 F.2d 283,290 (7th Cir. 1979). 
Later in the opinion, the court stated "we believe this provision [§ 307(d)(9)(D)] to be applicable 
and controlling .... " [d. at 291 n.14. However, despite such strong language, this language 
is merely dicta since the case was already fully decided on the good cause issue. 
344. See text at note 342 supra. 
345. 605 F.2d 283, 290 (7th Cir. 1979). 
346. [d. 
608 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 9:549 
designations, as well as all rulemaking347 by the EPA, were still in-
tended by Congress to be reviewed under section 307(d)(9). The 
Supreme Court denied certiorari in this case.348 Thus, the Seventh 
Circuit's opinion has created a split349 among the circuits over the 
proper application of section 307( d)(9)(D). 
In support of its interpretation of section 307( d), the Seventh Cir-
cuit presented two different arguments. The first argument 
presented by the court was essentially an analysis of the legislative 
history of section 307(d). In this analysis, the court noted that the 
legislative history referred to a "legislative-adjudicative" distinc-
tion350 which is a procedural issue not listed in section 307(d)(1) and 
"which relates to the propriety of any rulemaking at all."351 The cir-
cuit interpreted this reference to suggest that Congress intended the 
(d)(9)(D) standard "to extend to all rulemaking by the EPA 
whether or not it is in the explicit categories covered by all the provi-
sions of section [307(d)]."352 The court concluded its argument by 
quoting section 307(e) which provides: "Nothing in [the CAA] shall 
be construed to authorize judicial review of regulations or orders of 
the Administrator under [the CAA], except as provided in this sec-
tion."353 Thus, the Seventh Circuit under this analysis concluded 
that the legislative history of section 307( d) demonstrated Congress' 
intent to apply the (d)(9)(D) standard to such EPA action as the sec-
tion 107(d) designations. Applying this strict standard of review to 
the contested nonattainment designations, the court found no basis 
for declaring them invalid. 354 
347. While the Seventh Circuit said that the (dX9) standard applied to all rule making, it 
must be assumed that this means all rulemaking under the CAA, since § 307(d) only applies to 
actions under the CAA. 
348. 100 S.Ct. 710 (1980). 
349. For the other circuits' analyses of this issue, see text at notes 356-57 infra. 
350. The legislative history states: 
Under the flexible procedures specified by the committee, disputed questions of 
classification may arise concerning, for example, whether a given question involves 
"facts" or "policy" or whether a given fact is "legislative" or "adjudicative." To pre-
vent rule-making from bogging down in arguments about such matters, and to 
underline that the agency is authorized to adopt rule-making procedures to the in-
dividual case, the committee has limited the extent to which the Administrator's deci-
sions on such procedural matters may be reversed during judicial review. 
H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 322, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. 
NEWS 1077, 1401. 
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In a footnote,366 the court presented a second argument in support 
of its application of the (d)(9)(D) standard to the section 107(d) 
designation, stating: 
Arguably these designations fit within the subsection's applica-
tion to "the promulgation or revision of an implementation plan 
by the Administrator under section [llO(c)] ... " or to the 
"promulgation or revision of regulations under subtitle C of sub-
chapter 1 of this chapter (relating to prevention of significant 
deterioration of air quality and protection of visibility)." 42 
U.S.C. § 7607(d)(1)(B), (I). The designation of areas as "attain-
ment" or "non-attainment" is an integral part of the promulga-
tion of implementation plans and of regulations designed to 
prevent significant deterioration of air quality. 
The Seventh Circuit reasoned that, since the actions expressly stated 
in section 307(d)(1) could not be implemented without the section 
107(d) designations first being promulgated, then these designations 
had to be implicitly covered by the section 307( d)(9)(D) standard of 
review. Thus, utilizing this "arguably necessary" approach, the 
Seventh Circuit found the section 107(d) designations to be valid 
under the section 307(d)(9)(D) standard of review. 
Unlike the Seventh Circuit, both the Fifth and D.C. Circuits held 
that the Section 107(d) designations are plainly not subject to the 
section 307(d)(9)(D) standard of review.366 Since subsection (d)(1) 
specifically enumerates thirteen sections which the (d)(9) standard 
does apply to, these courts found no reason to determine that the 
section 107(d) designations should also be covered. Also, since the 
Administrator of the EPA did not argue that those designations 
should be covered by section 307(d) under section 307(d)(1)(N),367 
these courts found no reason to apply the (d)(9)(D) standard of 
reVIew. 
It is clear upon examination that the Seventh Circuit's arguments 
are strained and that the criticisms of this approach by the Fifth and 
D.C. Circuits are well founded. The Seventh Circuit's argument that 
section 107(d) designations are implicitly included because they are 
355. [d. at 290 n.I2. 
356. U.S. Steel Corp. v. EPA, 595 F.2d 207,215 n.18 (5th Cir. 1979); N.J. v. EPA, 626 F.2d 
1038, 1048-49 (D.C. Cir. 1980). The Sixth Circuit also mentioned the Seventh Circuit's use of 
the (dX9) issue, stating "[w]e would be inclined to rely upon this reasoning also if the Ad-
ministrator had exercised the powers granted him by 42 U.S.C. § 7607(dX1XN) (1976)." 
Republic Steel Corp. v. Costle, 621 F.2d 797, 805 n.2 (6th Cir. 1980). 
357. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(dX1XN) (Supp. III 1979). The subsection reads: "(N) such other ac-
tions as the Administrator may determine." 
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prerequisites for various sections which are explicitly covered368 is 
an extremely weak argument which, if accepted, would render sec-
tion 307(d)(1) meaningless. Under the CAA, virtually every section is 
a prerequisite or is arguably necessary for the implementation of one 
or more other sections under the Act. If Congress wanted this or any 
other section to be covered by section 307( d), it could have specified 
them as it did the thirteen others. 
Similar weaknesses are also apparent in the court's legislative 
history-section 307(e) argument. 369 The mere fact that the legislative 
report360 referred to a procedural distinction361 not ultimately ad-
dressed in subsection (d) does not support the argument that Con-
gress wanted section 307(d) "to extend to all rule making by the EPA 
whether or not it is in the explicit categories covered by all the provi-
sions of section 7607(d) [307(d)]."362 The remark on the legislative-
adjudicative distinction taken from the legislative history was mere-
ly an example given by the House Committee on Interstate and 
Foreign Commerce to show that Congress did not want the im-
plementation of the 1977 Amendments to be delayed by litigation 
over merely technical procedural arguments. In addition, contrary to 
the Seventh Circuit's argument, section 307(e) does not require that 
section 307(d) be the only standard under which actions under the 
CAA are reviewed. Section 307(e) merely requires that regulations 
issued under the CAA, if applicable, be reviewed under the stand-
ards set out in section 307( d)(9). It in no way supercedes review 
under the APA of those actions not listed in section 307(d)(1). In fact, 
section 307(d)(1) seems to provide for review under the APA for 
those sections of the CAA which are not expressly enumerated in 
(d)(1), stating that: 
The provisionR of section 553 through 557 and section 706 [of the 
APA] shall not, except as expressly provided in this subsection, 
apply to actions to which this subsection applies. This subsection 
shall not apply in the case of any rule or circumstance referred 
to in subparagraphs (A) or (B) of subsection 553(b) of title 5 of 
the United States Code [5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (Aj, (B) (1976)]. 
The Seventh Circuit's reading of section 307(d) could, if applied, 
have a dramatic effect on the scope of judicial review of agency 
rule making. The court's holding may be interpreted in two ways 
358. See text at notes 355-57 supra. 
359. See text at notes 348-54 supra. 
360. Id. 
361. Id. 
362. U.S. Steel Corp. v. EPA, 605 F.2d 283,291 (7th Cir. 1979). 
1981] NOTICE AND COMMENT REQUIREMENTS 611 
both of which have broad effects on the scope of review of agency 
rulemaking. These two interpretations are that the court: 1) essen-
tially amended the judicial review section of the AP A; or 2) required 
that section 307(d) be applied when reviewing all EPA 
rulemaking.363 Thus, the court in effect created two APA's, one for 
the EPA and one for all other agencies. In arguing for the denial of 
certiorari before the Supreme Court, even the EPA was apparently 
uncomfortable with the broad scope of this holding. Rather than try-
ing to have the high court uphold this argument, the EPA dismissed 
it as merely dicta. 364 Since certiorari was denied, the validity of the 
Seventh Circuit's holding remains unclear. 
The results of the Seventh Circuit's section 307(d) argument, if 
followed by other courts, will be to disrupt greatly the scope of 
review provision set out in the 1977 Amendments. Since the Seventh 
Circuit is the only court to adopt this interpretation to date, parties 
who desire to participate in rule making under the CAA , or any other 
rulemaking by the EPA, cannot know with certainty what rules 
govern the proceeding itself or any subsequent judicial review. Many 
companies, including the petitioners in the Seventh Circuit case,366 
operate in many circuits across the country. If the Seventh Circuit's 
interpretation does have vitality, it may force many large companies 
to operate under conflicting rules for identical procedures depending 
on where an action is brought. Since certiorari was denied by the 
Supreme Court, the six other circuits across the country have been 
left with no guidance as to which judicial review procedures they 
should apply. 
IV. REMEDIES 
A final area in which the split among the circuits has disrupted the 
uniform implementation of the Clean Air Act is the area of 
remedies. As with harmless error, the only courts which had to deal 
with the remedy issue were those which overturned the EPA desig-
nations because of a lack of good cause for bypassing section 553 pro-
cedures. The basic problem these courts faced was the perceived 
necessity of reconciling the conflicting demands of invalidating the 
363. U.S. Steel v. EPA, 100 S.Ct. 710,711 (1980) (opinion of J. Rehnquist dissenting from 
denial of Writ of Certiorari) (citing petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit at 14). 
364. 100 S.Ct. 710, 711 (1980) (opinion of J. Rehnquist dissenting from denial of Writ of 
Certiorari). 
365. The petitioners were U.S. Steel Corp. and Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company. 
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contested section 107(d) designations while at the same time trying 
to attain NP AAQS as quickly as possible. The Third, Fifth, and D.C. 
Circuits took similar, but not identical, approaches to this problem. 
Courts, under their broad equity powers, generally are afforded a 
great deal of discretion in fashioning remedies for procedural viola-
tions by administrative agencies.366 These broad equitable powers 
were defined in the Supreme Court case of Ford Motor Co. v. 
NLRB367 in which Chief Justice Hughes stated: 
While the court must act within the bounds of the statute and 
without intruding upon the administrative province, it may ad-
just its relief to the exigencies of the case in accordance with the 
equitable principles governing judicial action. The purpose of the 
judicial review is consonant with that of the administrative pro-
ceeding itself,-to secure a just result with a minimum of 
technical requirements. 368 
The Third Circuit attempted to use these equitable powers to pro-
tect both the rights of the injured parties and the goals of the CAA. 
In this respect, the court stated "[a]lthough the companies are enti-
tled to relief, we must be careful not to grant relief so broad as to en-
danger the Congressional scheme for the control of air pollution."369 
Thus, following the example of an earlier Third Circuit case, Du-
quesne Light Co. v. EPA,370 the court decided to invalidate only these 
section 107(d) designations contested by the petitioners, and only as 
they applied to the two petitioners in this case. The court remanded 
the contested designations for TSP to the Administrator, forebear-
ing him 
366. See Indiana and Michigan Electric Co. v. FPC, 502 F.2d 336,346-48 (D.C. Cir. 1974) 
(opinion on rehearing); Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 364, 373 (1939). 
367. 305 U.S. 364 (1939). 
368. Id. at 373. See Indiana and Michigan Electric Co. v. FPC, 502 F.2d 336, 346-48 (D.C. 
Cir. 1974) (opinion on rehearing). 
369. Sharon Steel Corp. v. EPA, 597 F.2d 377, 381 (3d Cir. 1979). 
370. 481 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1973). The court, in this case involving SIP's under the 1970 CAA, 
formulated a very narrow remedy. Essentially the court, except as to those companies which 
petitioned for review in this case, allowed contested SIP's to remain in effect. 
The court explained its reasons for invoking this limited remedy by stating: 
In resolving [the issues] . . . the Court is mindful of the desire for rapid action ex-
pressed by Congress in enacting the Clean Air Act, and the role the Act plays in pro-
tecting the nation's health by requiring clean air. Moreover, we are cognizant of the 
circumscribed opportunity for review provided by Congress, again manifesting an in-
sistence on expedition. In view of the limited review proceeding, this Court holds 
that, except as it applies to Duquesne, Pennsylvania Power, Ohio Edison and St. Joe 
Mineral, whose petitions for review were timely filed under section 307(b)(1), the 
Pennsylvania implementation plan remains in effect. 
481 F.2d 1, 10 (3d Cir. 1973). 
-- -------
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from applying to Sharon and Bethlehem any of the requirements 
or sanctions imposed on nonattainment areas by the 1977 
amendments to the Clean Air Act until the Administrator shall 
have conducted a limited legislative hearing in which he gives 
these two companies the required statutory notice and oppor-
tunity for participation and comment as provided by the AP A, 5 
U.S.C. § 553 (1976).371 
613 
Thus, the Third Circuit granted a very limited form of relief, attempt-
ing to protect the rights of the petitioners under the AP A while 
minimizing interference with the congressional scheme for attaining 
healthy air in the U.S. 
The Fifth Circuit decided to grant a broader remedy than the 
Third Circuit. It also recognized the need for a balanced approach, 
stating that "[w]hile the EPA ... must abide by the procedural re-
quirements of the Clean Air Act and the AP A, they must also act ex-
peditiously in order to fulfill Congress' principal goal of attaining the 
primary air quality standards by the end of 1982."372 Nevertheless, 
the court ordered that the contested designations be remanded and 
reconsidered by the EPA. Specifically, the Fifth Circuit held that the 
contested designations were invalid as to the parties affected by 
them. The court ordered the EPA to give notice of the proposed sec-
tion 107(d) designations and allow comments by the entire public 
when repromulgating the rules.373 
The Fifth Circuit recognized that such a procedure on remand 
would make it impossible to follow the statutory deadlines set out in 
the CAA. In an attempt to minimize delays, the court developed a 
new revised timetable for promulgating the rules and setting in mo-
tion the SIP process. The court gave Alabama374 nine months after 
final EPA promulgation of the section 107(d) designations to revise 
and submit its SIP. Although the court did not state how long the 
EPA had to promulgate the nonattainment lists, a conservative 
estimate would be three to four months.375 Finally, the court gave 
the EPA four months from the date of their submission to approve 
or disapprove these SIP's. Thus, by ordering such procedures on re-
371. 597 F.2d 377, 381-82 (3d Cir. 1979). 
372. u.s. Steel Corp. v. EPA, 595 F.2d 207,215 (5th Cir. 1979). 
373. [d. 
374. Actually, Alabama's agency responsible for state actions under the CAA-the Alabama 
Air Pollution Control Commission (AAPCC)-would revise the SIP's here. 
375. This estimate is conservative in that if thirty days are allotted for comments and thirty 
days are required by § 553(d) for a post-publication pre-effectiveness period, only one to two 
months would remain for the EPA to go over the comments and publish the designations. Con-
sidering that, in actuality, EPA took four months to publish these designations in 1978, a more 
accurate estimate would be five to six months. 
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mand, the effect of the Fifth Circuit's decision was to establish a new 
implementation schedule for the CAA eighteen to twenty-two 
months behind that originally mandated by Congress in the 1977 
Amendments.376 Also, the decision was applicable to all persons 
operating within the contested designation areas and thus had a 
much broader impact upon implementation of the CAA. 
The approach taken by the D.C. Circuit was virtually identical to 
that taken by the Fifth Circuit. While ordering the challenged 
designations to be set aside and be reconsidered with proper notice 
and comment procedures, the court, like the Third and Fifth Cir-
cuits, sought to minimize interference with the goals of the CAA.377 
Like the Fifth Circuit, the court did' not expressly limit these com-
ment procedures to just the petitioners named in the case. The court 
did, however, mandate that the reconsideration period proceed as 
expeditiously as possible and order that "in no cases shall the stage 
of the reconsideration process extend beyond the time allotted for 
such stage by 42 U.S.C. § 7407 [§ 107]."378 Thus, the D.C. Circuit 
took the broader remedial approach of the Fifth Circuit. It in-
validated the contested designations as to all parties affected and 
ordered a new schedule well over two years behind that originally 
mandated by Congress in the 1977 Amendments.379 
The tough dilemma faced by these three courts in fashioning an 
equitable remedy was clearly illustrated in criticisms of the Third 
and Fifth Circuit opinions made by the Seventh Circuit. 380 The 
courts were faced with a situation in which any remand of the con-
tested designations by the courts had to throw the statutory 
schedule off target by well over a year. Since the original section 
107(d) designations were due to be promulgated by the EPA on 
February 3, 1978, and the first of these circuit court cases was not 
decided until over fourteen months after that date,381 any reconsid-
376. This opinion came down on May 3, 1979, fifteen months after the original Feb. 3, 1978, 
deadline for promulgation of the S 107(d) designations. Adding anywhere from three to seven 
months to repromulgate the designations, the entire timetable was set back eighteen to 
twenty-two months. 
377. N.J. v. EPA, 626 F.2d 1038, 1050 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
378. [d. 
379. The D.C. Circuit opinion was decided on June 30,1980, approximately one year after 
the Third and Fifth Circuit opinions and almost twenty-seven months after the original 
deadline for the 107(d) designations. Thus, adding three to seven months for repromulgation 
of the listings, the D.C. Circuit outlined a timetable thirty to thirty-four months behind the 
original one set out in the 1977 Amendments. 
380. U.S. Steel Corp. v. EPA, 605 F.2d 283, 289 n.ll (7th Cir. 1979). 
381. The first opinion to come down was the Third Circuit's opinion of Sharon Steel v. EPA, 
597 F.2d 377 (3d Cir. 1979), decided on April 25, 1979. 
1981] NOTICE AND COMMENT REQUIREMENTS 615 
eration process will delay implementation by a minimum of fifteen 
months. In criticizing the decisions of the Third and Fifth Circuits, 
the Seventh Circuit stated "a remand at this point would intolerably 
delay the implementation of the statutory scheme and completely 
frustrate the Congressional purpose."382 On the other hand, the 
three courts which failed to find good cause were also faced with the 
responsibility of upholding the integrity of the AP A and protecting 
the rights of the injured parties. In an attempt to deal with this 
dilemma, the Third Circuit decided to protect the rights of just those 
parties who filed suit, viewing this as a compromise between the ap-
parently conflicting goals of the APA and the CAA. However, in 
making this compromise, the court had to leave many affected par-
ties without a remedy. This limited remedial approach was looked at 
critically by the Seventh Circuit which commented, "[i]f the rule is 
defective . . . we see no reason why anyone, whether they filed suit 
or not, should be subject to it."383 
The three courts which found the EPA's action to be without good 
cause faced a no-win situation. Any remedy invoked by them would 
significantly delay implementation of the CAA, while any attempt to 
minimize this effect would deny remedial relief to aggrieved parties. 
In terms of implementing the CAA, there is no doubt that the Third 
Circuit's approach was the least disruptive. It appears that, in 
reaching this balance, the Third Circuit placed great weight on the 
CAA's policy of attaining healthy air by 1982. The court decided that 
this policy goal was more important than the rights of non-parties 
adversely affected by these designations. 
The upshot of these cases has been to fragment greatly the 1977 
Amendments' implementation process. One of the major goals of the 
CAA over the past ten years has been to have a unified national ap-
proach in which no region of the country will have an unfair 
economic advantage. Thus, under the 1977 Amendments, all areas 
with nonattainment problems were placed on an identical statutory 
schedule. However, as a result of this litigation over the section 
107(d) designations, a number of the nation's AQCR's are on entirely 
different schedules for attaining NP AAQS for various criteria 
pollutants. For example, while most areas of the country are still re-
quired to attain NPAAQS by December 31,1982, those AQCR's in-
volved in the D.C. Circuit case do not have to attain their health based 
standard for ozone until some time in 1985. People living in those 
382. 605 F.2d 283,289 n.ll (7th Cir. 1979). 
383. Id. 
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regions of the country will be forced to breathe air considered 
unhealthy for over two years longer than the rest of the nation. 
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The split among the circuits over the validity of the section 107(d) 
designations has created a great deal of fragmentation and confu-
sion in a number of areas. In a narrow sense, this litigation has 
created confusion over the application of various legal doctrines, 
most notably the APA's good cause exceptions and the CAA's sec-
tion 307(d) scope of review provision. However, in a broader sense, 
the outcome of this litigation has been to undermine, to a significant 
extent, many of the goals which Congress sought to achieve in pass-
ing the 1977 Amendments to the CAA. The aftermath of this unfor-
tunate litigation reveals that responsibility or blame cannot be placed 
in anyone area. Yet, upon close examination, there are many impor-
tant lessons to be learned from this litigation which have application 
to both the CAA and virtually all other environmental legislation. 
Of the legal doctrines affected by this split among the circuits, the 
section 553 good cause exceptions were affected most profoundly. 
While the overall scope of these exceptions was in a somewhat mud-
dled state prior to this litigation, one of the clearest lines of cases 
under the good cause exceptions had been the express deadline 
cases.384 The earlier case law in this area had been virtually uniform 
in finding good cause for bypassing normal section 553 procedures 
whenever an agency did not have enough time to comply with these 
section 553 procedures and still meet the mandated deadlines. 
However, the Third, Fifth, and D.C. Circuits failed to find good 
cause despite the fact that the EPA could not comply with the sec-
tion 553 procedures and still meet its ninety-day statutory deadline, 
putting this line of cases in a confused state. Also, this litigation has 
apparently created precedent in three circuits that severe health ef-
fects are not enough to justify good cause. This is an extremely 
disturbing development, especially in light of the fact that most cases 
involving economic urgency have been found to satisfy the re-
quirements of these section 553 exceptions.385 
A second legal doctrine left in a muddled state as a result of this 
litigation is the scope of review to be applied to agency actions under 
the CAA and, more specifically, the scope of CAA section 307(d). 
While the plain language of section 307( d) clearly states that the 
384. See text at notes 183-209 supra. 
385. See text at notes 163-88 supra. 
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(d)(9)(D) review standard applies only to those actions under the 
CAA specifically listed in subsection (d)(1) , the Seventh Circuit's 
unique interpretation of this section has left this view somewhat in 
doubt. By interpreting section 307(d) to apply, not only to section 
107(d) designations, but to all EPA rulemaking as well, the Seventh 
Circuit has, in effect, made all EPA action under the CAA subject to 
the strict (d)(9)(D) standard of review. Thus, this decision makes the 
legality of various future action by the EPA under the CAA depend 
largely upon what circuit the issue is litigated in. While the Seventh 
Circuit's interpretation of section 307(d) can possibly be dismissed as 
dicta,886 the fact remains that the court called it a "compelling" 
alternative holding, and thus it stands, at least arguably, as good 
law. 
Other legal issues affected, to a lesser extent, by this litigation in-
clude the harmless error doctrine and the scope of remedial relief in 
rectifying improper administration action. Although the three courts 
which found a section 553 violation were unanimous in holding that 
the harmless error doctrine was not applicable, there is some 
language in the Sixth Circuit opinion, arguably dicta, suggesting 
that the post hoc comments received by the EPA were a reasonable 
alternative to normal AP A rulemaking procedure. Thus, this opinion 
creates some confusion as to whether post hoc comments can be con-
sidered a reasonable alternative which makes harmless a violation of 
section 553 notice and comment rulemaking procedures. In addition, 
the Third Circuit's narrow approach to remedial relief creates some 
confusion as to which parties this relief should be granted when such 
relief could seriously undermine a congressionally mandated 
timetable. 
While the legal confusion created in this litigation will certainly 
have important effects on the outcome of future litigation, at least of 
equal importance is the impact this litigation will have on the im-
plementation of the CAA. One of the major goals of the CAA was the 
creation of a uniform nationwide approach towards attaining healthy 
air in America by the end of 1982. This nationwide approach was 
taken because air pollution knows no geographical limitations, and 
Congress wanted all citizens in the United States to be able to 
breathe clean air by a specified date.887 In addition, Congress deter-
mined that such an approach would prevent a state from attaining an 
unfair economic advantage by having less stringent air quality stand-
386. See note 343 supra. 
387. See generaUy Quarles, supra note 32. 
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ards which would attract more industrial development in that state 
than in states with stricter standards.388 However, largely as a result 
of this litigation, this uniform nationwide approach has been to a 
significant extent undermined. Rather than having the entire nation 
attain NPAAQS by December 31, 1982, now large segments of the 
country will still remain as nonattainment areas for various 
pollutants well into 1984 and 1985. 
Another goal of the 1977 Amendments which has been undermined 
is the avoidance of excessive and unnecessary litigation. The legis-
lative history indicated that one purpose of the 1977 Amendments 
was "to provide greater legislative guidance"389 so as to avoid ex-
cessive court challenges which had led to long delays in implementa-
tion of earlier versions of the CAA. Section 307(d) of the 1977 
Amendments, which made overturning of agency action quite dif-
ficult, was passed in pursuance of this goal. However, as these five 
cases demonstrate, excessive litigation still resulted. 
The final and most significant goal of the 1977 Amendments 
undermined by this litigation is that of attaining NP AAQS nation-
wide by December 31, 1982. Congressional attempts to clean the air 
in the United States date back to 1955 with only partial success be-
ing registered during this twenty-six year period. Beginning with 
the introduction of the NP AAQS concept in the 1970 Act, Congress 
has been pursuing a standard based solely on public health for the 
past eleven years. Well aware of the severe health effects related to 
air pollution, Congress sought to attain "healthy air" by including a 
strict statutory schedule in the 1977 Amendments, requiring that 
NP AAQS be attained nationwide by 1982. However, the result of 
this litigation has been to essentially rewrite the 1977 Amendments 
in those circuits finding a section 553 violation. Rather than uphold 
Congress' urgent attempt to attain healthy air by the end of 1982, 
the Third, Fifth, and D.C. Circuits decided to create a new timetable 
two to three years behind that of the 1977 Amendments. Thus, per-
sons living in these circuits will be forced to breathe unhealthy air 
long after the rest of the nation has ceased doing so. 
In hindsight, it is clear that responsibility or blame for this con-
troversial litigation must be pointed in a number of different direc-
tions. First of all, the legislative history and congressional drafting 
of section 107(d) were inadequate. Since Congress sought to elimi-
388. [d. 
389. H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONGo & An. 
NEWS 1077, 1079. 
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nate excessive litigation in the 1977 Amendments, one way in which 
it could have furthered this goal was to make clear whether the sec-
tion 107(d) designations required normal section 553 rulemaking pro-
cedures. In this way Congress could have anticipated beforehand 
and eliminated this unnecessary litigation rather than relying on the 
courts to determine the applicability of the two good cause excep-
tions. 
The second reason for the occurrence of this litigation is the am-
biguity of the good cause exceptions themselves. While it is clear 
that Congress did not intend these two exceptions to be escape 
clauses, their actual scope has been a source of confusion and debate 
for over thirty years. Also during this time period, courts have been 
continually confused in trying to differentiate between the scope of 
the (b XB) and (dX3) exceptions. Since the five circuit cases involving 
section 107(d) designations have come to conflicting views on the ap-
plicability of these exceptions, as well as in interpreting the scope of 
the (bXB) and (dX3) exceptions, perhaps it is time for Congress to 
give more direct guidance on these questions. While it is normally 
the role of the courts to resolve such issues, it is clear that the am-
biguity surrounding these concepts has made them largely counter-
productive. Thus, the need for clarification of these concepts to avoid 
future ambiguity is great. 
Another factor contributing to this unnecessary litigation was 
recalcitrance on the part of the steel industry. As indicated earlier in 
this discussion, many major American industries, most notably the 
steel industry, have continually sought refuge in the courts from 
meeting their obligations under the CAA. While much of this litiga-
tion by industry has been aimed at protecting its legitimate economic 
interests, some of it has been clearly unnecessary. This excessive 
recalcitrance on the part of the industry, and the steel companies in 
particular, was noted not only in the legislative history of the 1977 
Amendments,390 but also in the Sixth and Seventh Circuit opin-
ions. 391 Both of these circuits determined that, when viewed in light 
of the long record of resistance in meeting their duties under the 
CAA, this action by the steel companies was merely another ex-
ample of their procrastination. Thus, both courts refused to uphold 
the steel companies' argument, realizing that to do so would result in 
another two-year delay in implementing the CAA. 
390. See note 240 supra. 
391. U.S. Steel Corp. v. EPA, 605 F.2d 283,287 n.5 (7th Cir. 1979); Republic Steel Corp. v. 
Costie, 621 F.2d 797, 799, 803 (6th Cir. 1980). 
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Also, in light of this long record of industry recalcitrance, one must 
question the general wisdom of the EPA's action here. While there 
does exist a strong legal basis for the EPA's argument that good 
cause was present to bypass normal section 553 procedures, in prac-
tical terms it may not have been a wise move to utilize these excep-
tions. Relying on past history, the EPA could reasonably have ex-
pected industry to challenge them on such an issue. In fact, as the 
Third Circuit case illustrates, the EPA had forewarning of the possi-
ble legal problems inherent in bypassing section 553 procedures and, 
thus, was well aware that this litigation might arise.392 Thus, in 
order to implement the CAA as quickly as possible, the approximate 
two-month delay which would have occurred if section 553 proce-
dures were followed may have been a small price to pay compared to 
the much longer delays likely to grow out of this litigation. 
A final factor contributing to this unfortunate litigation is the lack 
of Supreme Court review. When the petitioners in the Seventh Cir-
cuit case applied for certiorari to the Supreme Court, many of the 
fragmenting effects of this litigation were readily apparent. Also, 
with the Sixth and D.C. Circuit cases yet to be decided, it appeared 
that this case was ripe for Supreme Court review. However, the 
Supreme Court disagreed, denying the steel companies' writ of cer-
tiorari and leaving the many issues presented in these cases without 
fmal resolution by the high court. 
Yet, even in its denial of certiorari, the Supreme Court demon-
strated the divisions and ambiguities which have arisen out of these 
cases. Writing for a three man dissent,393 Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
recognized that the problem of tight statutory deadlines is one which 
occurs quite often with environmental legislation. In pointing out 
both the need for guidance in this area and also the need to rectify 
the more specific problem of differing interpretations of the good 
cause exceptions by the Third, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits, Mr. 
Justice Rehnquist stated: 
In the area of environmental regulation, . . . tight statutory 
schedules are both quite common and frequently unmet. If 
EPA's actions in the present case pass without review by this 
Court, persons subject to EPA's jurisdiction in different parts of 
the country will be entitled to different procedural protections 
when either they or EPA find themselves up against a 
deadline.394 
392. Sharon Steel Corp. v. EPA, 597 F.2d 377,382 (3d Cir. 1979). 
393. The three dissenting justices were J. Rehnquist, J. White, and J. Powell. 
394. 100 S.Ct. 710, 711 (1980). 
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Also, in regard to the section 307( d) issue raised in the Seventh Cir-
cuit opinion, Rehnquist stated: 
Although the Court of Appeals suggested that the promulgation 
of the list "arguably" could be characterized as one of those 
enumerated actions, it went well beyond the statutory language 
to hold that "Congress meant this limitation on review of pro-
cedural errors to extend to all rulemaking by the EPA whether 
or not it is in the explicit categories covered by the provision of 
section [307(d»)." ... As petitioners point out, this ruling has 
the effect of establishing two Administrative Procedure Acts, 
one for the EPA and one for all other agencies. 395 
In concluding, Rehnquist demonstrated his belief in the need for 
Supreme Court review in this case by stating: 
We can avoid invocation of our jurisdiction to resolve conflicts 
among the decisions of the Courts of Appeals construing impor-
tant sections of the statute only by breaking faith with the spirit, 
if not the letter of those Acts of Congress making our jurisdic-
tion in virtually all cases discretionary rather than obligatory. I 
therefore would grant the writ of certiorari. 396 
In conclusion, despite congressional efforts to the contrary, the 
CAA has once again become subject to many of the pitfalls which the 
1977 Amendments desperately sought to avoid. Because of the five 
circuit court cases discussed in this article, the 1977 Amendments, 
like its numerous predecessors, have only met with partial success. 
However, as the CAA comes up for congressional review in 1981, 
there are many important lessons to be learned from this litigation. 
First, if Congress is still intent on keeping its commitment to the 
public health concept, this review period will be the appropriate time 
to make this intent clear. This dedication to the public health concept 
can best be demonstrated by reaffirmance of the NP AAQS and 
deadline concepts thereby forcing the states to make as strenuous an 
effort as is reasonably possible to attain healthy air by a specified 
date. Certainly, many aspects of the CAA must undergo new cost-
benefit analyses at this time and it is possible that in some cases cer-
tain deadlines may have to be extended. However, the overall impor-
tance of public health in terms of economic welfare as well as in 
social costs remains so great that this commitment should be reaf-
firmed. 
Second, the long history of delay in attaining the goals of the CAA 
makes clear that the deadline concept is necessary in order to deal 
395. [d. 
396. [d. at 712. 
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most effectively with the nation's air pollution problem. While this 
concept (Le., technology-forcing) has not been completely effective, 
it is only since this concept was adopted in 1970 that significant prog-
ress has been made in cleaning up the nation's air. Thus, the current 
deadline approach should be retained with as little change as is 
reasonably possible. 
Finally, Congress must reaffirm and tighten up its commitment to 
avoid excessive litigation under the CAA. By more clearly defining 
when certain actions should be exempt from AP A rule making pro-
cedures and by expanding the list of actions covered by section 
307(d), unnecessary litigation such as this can be avoided in the 
future. 
